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ARTICLE
The International Law Commission's Draft
Convention on the Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property
VIRGINIA MORRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of sovereign or state immunity exempts a state and its
property from the judicial jurisdiction of any other state for claims relat-
ing to sovereign or governmental activities, also referred to as public acts
(jure imperii) in contrast with private or commercial acts (jure ges-
tiones). The jurisdictional immunity of a state and its property has devel-
oped over the years in the domestic courts of the various nations that
have addressed cases in which private citizens have attempted to sue for-
eign states. This approach has resulted in a lack of uniformity in the
enunciations of the principle, the reasons for granting or denying immu-
nity, and the circumstances in which a private party can successfully
bring an action against a foreign state.
With the increasing interaction between private parties and foreign
states which may give rise to litigation, there is a growing need for cer-
tainty and predictability in the law of state immunity. Private parties en-
tering into contracts with foreign states need to know the requirements
for obtaining judicial redress in the event of a dispute arising out of the
contract. States expanding their presence and activities around the globe
need to know the circumstances in which they may be required to re-
spond to a lawsuit filed in the court of another state. An international
convention on state immunity, such as the provisional draft prepared by
the International Law Commission, would provide greater clarity and
consistency in this increasingly important area of international law.
This article will discuss the law of sovereign immunity as it has de-
veloped in the United States, the role of the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) in codifying and developing customary international law, the
* Virginia Morris is a Legislative Assistant to Congressman Norman D. Shumway. She
received her B.A. at San Diego State University and her J.D. at McGeorge School of Law,
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ILC Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, and the future of the draft convention based on the views
expressed by Member States.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
The United States has been at the forefront of the development of
the principles of international law which govern sovereign or state immu-
nity. The first judicial recognition of this immunity is found in a Supreme
Court decision written by Chief Justice Marshall in 1812, The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.' The case concerned an armed vessel of France
which had entered a U.S. port. It was alleged that the ship, the Schooner
Exchange, was unlawfully seized by persons acting on behalf of France
under orders of Emperor Napoleon. The Supreme Court held that the
armed vessel in the service of a friendly foreign state, though clearly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, was immune from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The Court recognized immunity with re-
gard to foreign sovereigns and the exercise of their sovereign rights based
upon their independence and the equality and dignity of all states. The
Court also gave weight to foreign relations considerations.2
The general principles and policy considerations which provided the
foundation for the principle of sovereign immunity are as valid today as
they were in 1812. Unfortunately, fundamental aspects of the Court's rea-
soning have been overlooked in the intervening years as states have en-
croached upon the commercial, financial, industrial, trading and other ac-
tivities which have normally fallen within the domain of private citizens.3
The immunity extended to foreign states because of The Schooner Ex-
change was recognized as a limited exception to the jurisdiction of na-
tional courts. The jurisdiction of national courts has been traditionally
1. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2. Id. at 137:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every
sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not
seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be ex-
tended to him .... This perfect equality and absolute independence of sover-
eigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to wave the exercise of a part of that com-
plete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute
of every nation.
3. Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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considered an inherent attribute of state sovereignty and independence.
4
After The Schooner Exchange, the courts refrained from exercising juris-
diction in cases against the person of a foreign sovereign. Today, this is
covered by the immunities extended to a sovereign or head of state ra-
tione personae, or involving a foreign state in the exercise of its sovereign
rights.6 The immunity recognized in The Schooner Exchange did not ex-
tend to all activities of a foreign state or its agents, such as the trading
activities of merchant vessels or the prince's ownership of private prop-
erty in another state.'
The question of the extent to which a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state is reflected in the restrictive and absolute theories of
sovereign immunity.' States which have adopted the restrictive theory
limit the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state to cases involving sov-
ereign or governmental functions and thereby allow private parties to
bring claims arising out of other types of activities. In contrast, the na-
tional courts of states which apply the absolute theory cannot consider
any claim which impleads a foreign state or its property. The very act of
requiring a sovereign state to answer for its conduct in the courts of an-
other state is considered an unacceptable affront to the dignity, indepen-
dence and equality of the foreign state.
The absolute theory of state immunity, which might have been more
persuasive during the last century when state activities were primarily of
a governmental or sovereign nature, ignores the present reality of interna-
tional relations in which many states are extensively involved in commer-
cial activities within the jurisdiction of other states.8 Absolute immunity
clearly exceeds the justifications for suspending the jurisdiction of the lo-
cal courts by encompassing sovereign as well as non-sovereign activities.
The injustice inherent in failing to distinguish between traditionally sov-
ereign activities and those which are not, and thereby effectively allowing
states to engage in non-sovereign activities with impunity, was recognized
by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Charkieh decision of 1873. The case con-
cerned a public vessel used for commercial service:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no doc-
trine of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize a
4. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
5. Id. at 137.
6. Id. at 144-45.
7. For a discussion of the absolute and restrictive theories of sovereign immunity, see
Sir Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunities. Recent Developments, 167 RECUEIL DES
COURS 113-284 (1980); and S. Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National
Authorities, 149 RECUEIL DES COURs 87-215 (1976).
8. See Documents of the 34th Session, [1982] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N para 117, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (part 1):
Owing to the increasing extent of entry of State Activities in the domains ear-
lier reserved for individuals such as commercial, industrial and financial fields,
supporters of an unqualified doctrine have become a diminishing minority ever
since the dawn of the present century.
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sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader, when it is for his
benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw
off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming
for the first time, all the attributes of his character .... '
This debate was settled for purposes of U.S. courts in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).'0 This was the first national
legislation codifying the rules which determine when a private party can
maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities and when a for-
eign state is entitled to immunity. The FSIA reflected an earlier decision
to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity announced in the
Tate letter of 1952." The letter also transferred responsibility for assess-
ing a claim of sovereign immunity in a particular case from the State
Department to the courts. This came about as an effort to eliminate polit-
ical considerations, to reduce foreign policy implications, and to thus en-
sure that all state immunity claims would be objectively decided by the
judicial branch pursuant to a uniform standard. Despite the Tate letter
and the FSIA, the earlier movement of U.S. courts away from the re-
stricted holding in The Schooner Exchange case is still apparent in the
immunity extended to a purely commercial enterprise or a merchant ship
which is owned by a foreign state. The Congress has considered amend-
ments to the FSIA which would limit the immunity extended to state
enterprises and resolve some of the practical problems encountered in ap-
plying the statute."
III. UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION EFFORTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
The International Law Commission 3 was created by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in 1947 to promote the codification and progressive devel-
opment of international law pursuant to article 13 of the United Nations
Charter. 4 The Commission consists of 34 persons of recognized compe-
tence in international law who serve in their individual capacity, rather
than as representatives of states. The General Assembly elects the mem-
bers based on their individual qualifications and the need to assure repre-
sentation of the principal legal systems of the world. 5
As early as 1948, the United Nations recognized the importance of
9. The Charkieh, 4 L.R. Adm. & Eccl. 59, 99-100 (1873).
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), 1441(a)
(1982), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976).
11. Tate, Tate Letter of 1952, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984.
12. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts 1976-1986, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1986).
13. U.N., The Work of the International Law Commission, U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.11
(3d ed. 1980).
14. G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105 (1947). (Under Article 13 of the U.N.
Charter, the General Assembly is authorized to initiate studies and make recommendations
to promote the progressive development of international law and its codification.)
15. The Work of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, arts. 2, 3 & 8.
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codifying the law of state immunity in the U.N. Survey of International
Law and Selection of Topics for Codification:
There would appear to be little doubt that the question - in all its
aspects - of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States is capable and
in need of codification. It is a question which figures, more than any
other aspect of international law, in the administration of justice
before municipal courts. The increased economic activities of States in
the foreign sphere and the assumption by the State in many countries
of the responsibility for the management of the principal industries
and of transport have added to the urgency of a comprehensive regu-
lation of the subject. While there exists a large measure of agreement
on the general principle of immunity, the divergences and uncertain-
ties in its application are conspicuous not only as between various
States but also in the internal jurisprudence of States.'
In 1978, the Commission began preparing draft articles on the juris-
dictional immunities of states and their property to provide the basis for
the first international convention to address all of the major aspects of
this important area of international law. The distinguished Special Rap-
porteur, Ambassador Sompong Sucharitkul, prepared eight reports and
proposed draft articles which served as the basis for the Commission's
work. 17 These reports provide a detailed analysis of the principle of state
immunity and a survey of state practice in terms of national legislation,
bilateral and multilateral conventions, decisions of national courts, official
records and correspondence, and the views expressed by Member States
in response to a questionnaire circulated by the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations."8
It is important to note the limited state practice in this area of law
that has developed at the national level. In addition to the United States,
only six countries have enacted statutes specifically addressing state im-
munity, which were adopted after the FSIA in 1976: Australia, Canada,
Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 9 There are
no decisions of international tribunals and only one multilateral conven-
tion on state immunity, the European Convention on State Immunity and
Additional Protocol.
2 0
16. U.N., Survey of International Law and Selection of Topics for Codification, 1 52,
U.N. Sales No. 1948.V.1. (I).
17. See generally The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of States and Their Property, 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1978.
18. See U.N., MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROP-
ERTY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20 (1982).
19. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, 196 AusTL. ACTS P. 1985; Canadian State
Immunity Act, III Can. Stat. 95 (1980-83); Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance (1981), Sin-
gapore State Immunity Act (1979), United Kingdom State Immunity Act (1978), in U.N.,
MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.B/20 (1982) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities].
20. European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol, Counsel of Eu-
rope, No. 74 (1972), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 [hereinafter European Convention].
1989
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Under the guidance of the Special Rapporteur, Ambassador
Sucharitkul, the Commission completed the first reading, or the provi-
sional adoption, of the draft articles during its 1986 session." Member
States were asked to provide comments on the draft by January 1, 1988,
before the Commission gives its final approval during the second reading.
The second reading usually progresses at a faster pace than the first.
Once the Commission has approved the articles, taking into consideration
the views of Member States, the draft will be reviewed by the General
Assembly and the Sixth Committee of the Assembly which is responsible
for international law. The General Assembly may call for a conference to
formulate a convention on the basis of the Commission's final draft. If the
draft is considered controversial by Member States, the Assembly may
simply take note of the Commission's work or recognize the draft articles
in the form of a resolution or declaration." State immunity has been a
controversial subject in the Sixth Committee which creates an uncertain
future for the ILC articles. The Commission's reports and draft articles
will serve as highly authoritative evidence on the customary law of state
immunity.
IV. ILC DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF
STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY
The ILC draft convention23 consists of 28 articles which are divided
into five parts:
I. Introduction: which contains five articles concerning the scope of
the draft, definitions and interpretative provisions, privileges and immu-
nities not affected by the draft, and the principle of non-retroactivity;
II. General Principles: which contains five articles concerning the
principle of state immunity, giving effect to this immunity, express or im-
plied consent to jurisdiction, and the effect of counterclaims made by a
state;
III. [Limitations on] [Exceptions to] State Immunity: which contains
nine articles concerning the absence of state immunity for a claim relat-
ing to a commercial contract, an employment contract, personal injury or
property damage, ownership or possession of property, intellectual or in-
dustrial property, taxes and import duties, participation in a corporation,
commercial shipping, or arbitration;
IV. State Immunity in Respect of Property from Measures of Con-
straint: which contains three articles concerning the immunity of state
property, the separate consent required for jurisdiction over state prop-
erty, and the special protection provided for certain types of property;
21. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 41
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 9-24, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986), reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1986/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n].
22. See The Work of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at art. 23.
23. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21.
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and
V. Miscellaneous Provisions: which contains five articles concerning
service of process, default judgment, immunity from measures of coer-
cion, procedural immunities, and nondiscrimination.
The Commission plans to consider two additional parts on dispute
settlement procedures and final provisions later, when it returns to the
subject of the jurisdictional immunities of states and their property.
V. INTRODUCTION TO ILC DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY
A. Scope of the ILC Draft: Articles 1 and 4
The ILC articles on state immunity are confined by article 1 to "the
immunity of one state and its property from the jurisdiction of the courts
of another state." '24 Diplomatic immunities are expressly excluded from
the scope of the Commission's work. Under article 4, the draft does not
apply to or in any way affect the immunities extended to a state with
regard to the functions of, or the persons associated with, its diplomatic,
consular or special missions as well as missions or delegations to interna-
tional organizations or international conferences.2 5 The commentary to
article 4 clearly indicates the intention "to preserve the privileges and
immunities already accorded to specific entities and persons by virtue of
existing general international law and more fully by relevant international
conventions in force, which remain unaffected by the present articles."2
The conventions listed in the commentary include: the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,27 the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations of 1963,28 the Convention on Special Missions of 1969,29 and
the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Rela-
tions with International Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975.30
The personal immunities and privileges accorded to foreign sover-
eigns and other heads of state ratione personae are also expressly ex-
cluded from the ILC draft under article 4." In contrast, the jurisdictional
immunities of states covered by the articles would include the immunities
extended to sovereigns or heads of state acting as state organs or state
24. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
28. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
29. Convention on Special Missions and Optional Protocol Concerning the Settlement
of Disputes of 1969, G.A. Res. 2530 (XXIV) of Dec. 8, 1969, Annex.
30. Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with Inter-
national Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975, Doc. A/CONF. 67/16.
31. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
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representatives.2 Thus the distinction is between the diplomatic immuni-
ties enjoyed by an individual by virtue of his or her office and the immu-
nities extended to a state with regard to acts performed on its behalf by a
state official or representative.
It is important to differentiate between the absolute immunity ac-
corded to a foreign sovereign or head of state and the limited jurisdic-
tional immunity extended to a foreign state with regard to its governmen-
tal activities. As Sir Ian Sinclair, a distinguished international jurist and
former member of the Commission, has pointed out:
There is accordingly a theoretical distinction between sovereign im-
munity and State immunity, although the two concepts are regularly
and almost indiscriminately confused. Sovereign immunity in the
strict sense of the term should be taken to refer to the immunity
which a personal sovereign or Head of State enjoys when present in
the territory of another State. It can be argued that international law
still requires absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of the local
courts to be accorded to personal sovereigns or Heads of State, at
least in respect of their public acts. That the immunity accorded to
personal sovereigns or Heads of State is primarily an immunity ra-
tione personae appears to be confirmed by the fact that it is not en-
joyed by ex-sovereigns in respect of their private acts .... This initial
confusion between the sovereign as Head of State and the State itself
may have had some influence on the development of the absolute im-
munity doctrine as applied to States.3
As the Special Rapporteur has clearly stated, the principle of state
immunity was never intended to provide an absolute immunity:
State immunity was never considered to be an absolute principle in
any sense of the term. At no time was immunity viewed as an absolute
rule or a jus cogens or imperative norm. The rule was from the begin-
ning subject to various qualifications, limitations and exceptions. This
is recognized even in the recent legislation adopted in socialist coun-
tries. The difference of opinion seems to linger only in the areas where
exceptions and limitations are put into application.
The scope of the ILC draft is consistent with the various national
statutes and the European Convention which address the immunity of a
foreign state and its property from the jurisdiction of national courts.3 5
B. Definitions: Article 2
Article 2 defines two terms for purposes of the ILC draft: 1) a court;
32. Id. at 27, 30.
33. Sinclair, supra note 7, at 197-98.
34. Documents of the 35th session, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 1).
35. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. Preamble & § 1602; European Convention, supra note 20.
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and 2) a commercial contract. 6 A court is defined as a state organ, how-
ever named, entitled to exercise judicial functions. This broad description
is designed to cover any exercise of judicial authority by courts or other
state organs in different legal systems. Since the scope of the draft is de-
fined with reference to courts, this definition takes on a special signifi-
cance. As discussed in the commentary:
Judicial functions may be exercised in connection with a legal pro-
ceeding at different stages, prior to the institution of a legal proceed-
ing, or at the final stage of enforcement of judgments. Such judicial
functions may include adjudication of litigation or dispute settlement,
determination of questions of law and fact, order of interim and en-
forcement measures at all stages of legal proceedings and such other
administrative and executive functions as are normally exercised by,
or under, the judicial authorities of a State in connection with, in the
course of, or pursuant to a legal proceeding. "
The principle of state immunity comes into play at every stage in a
legal proceeding against a foreign state from service of process to prejudg-
ment attachment, to adjudication on the merits and the execution of a
judgment. The broad definition in article 2 would include the full range of
legal actions which may be taken against a foreign state. The article 2
definition is consistent with the national statutes which define a court as
any body which exercises judicial powers.3 8
A commercial contract, as defined in article 2, includes three types of
contracts or transactions: 1) the sale or purchase of goods or the supply of
services; 2) financial transactions, including loans and guarantees; and 3)
any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or
professional nature, with the exception of employment contracts which
are dealt with separately in the ILC draft. 9
The United Kingdom State Immunity Act uses the term "commercial
transaction" which is defined as any contract for goods or services, any
loan or financial transaction, or any other transaction or activity of a
commercial, industrial, financial professional or other similar character
not involving the exercise of sovereign authority. The laws of Australia,
Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa contain similar definitions. The
European Convention does not define its use of the term "industrial,
commercial or financial activity" except by reference to engaging in activ-
ity in the same manner as a private person. The Canadian law uses the
term "commercial activity" meaning any transaction, act, or regular
course of conduct of a commercial character. The FSIA also uses the term
"commercial activity" to include a particular transaction or act, such as a
contract, as well as a regular course of commercial conduct.'0 As ex-
36. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9.
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 19.
39. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9-10.
40. 196 Ausm. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
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plained in the commentary to the FSIA, this term is intended to cover a
wide range of activities:
The courts will have a good deal of latitude in determining what is a
"commercial activity" [for purposes of this bill]. It seems unwise to
attempt a precise definition of this term, even if that were practicable.
[Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or a prod-
uct, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its employment or
engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing
agents, or its investment in a security of an American corporation,
would be among those included within the definition.]41
The ILC term "commercial contract" does not expressly include a
commercial activity or course of conduct and, therefore, appears to be
more restrictive than the definitions of a "commercial transaction" or a
"commercial activity" contained in the national statutes. The ILC com-
mentary recognizes the inherent difficulties associated with the differ-
ences in technical terminology in the various official U.N. languages. The
term "transaction" is intended to expand the definition to include com-
mercial activity other than contracts. It is said to the expression "acte de
commerce."'42 Also the third element of the definition is a catchall cate-
gory including any other commercial contract or transaction. According to
the commentary, this includes: "other types of contracts or transactions
of a commercial, industrial, trading or professional nature, thus taking in
a wide variety of fields of State activities, especially manufacturing and
possibly investment, as well as other transactions. 4 3
Due to the significance of the state immunity exception for commer-
cial activity, it is important that the definition of a commercial contract
be amended to include a commercial activity or a course of conduct which
does not result in a contract but may nonetheless give rise to a claim
against a foreign state. This would be consistent with existing state prac-
tice reflected in the various state immunity statutes and the approach
initially proposed by the Special Rapporteur who recommended using the
term "trading or commercial activity" to encompass a regular course of
commercial conduct as well as a particular commercial transaction or
act.44
19; European Convention, supra note 20; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b) & 1441(d).
41. See Revised Section-by-Section Analysis of the FSIA, 119 CONG. REC. 3433, 3436
(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1973). (hereinafter Revised Section-by-Section).
42. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 35, U.N. Doc. a/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1983 Int'l L.
Comm'n].
43. Id. at 76.
44. Documents of the 32nd Session, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1 33, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1).
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C. Interpretative Provisions: Article 3
The ILC draft contains two interpretative provisions in article 3 con-
cerning: 1) the concept of a state for purposes of jurisdictional immuni-
ties; and 2) the commercial character of state conduct.4 5 The commercial
character of a contract or transaction is to be determined under article
3(2) which provides as follows:
In determining whether a contract for the sale or purchase of goods or
the supply of services is commercial, reference should be made pri-
marily to the nature of the contract, but the purpose of the contract
should also be taken into account if, in the practice of that State, that
purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of
the contract.
46
The commentary discusses this two-pronged approach which incor-
porates an objective and a subjective criterion for determining the com-
mercial character of a contract or transaction:
In the first place, reference should be made to the nature of the con-
tract or transaction. If it is established that it is non-commercial or
governmental in nature, there would be no necessity to enquire fur-
ther as to its purpose. However, if after the application of the "na-
ture" test, the contract or transaction appears to be commercial, then
it is open to the State to contest this finding by reference to the
purpose of the contract or transaction. This double criterion of the
nature and purpose of the contract or transaction is designed to pro-
vide an adequate safeguard and protection for developing countries,
especially in their endeavours to promote national economic develop-
ment. States should be given an opportunity to maintain that, in
their practice, a given contract or transaction should be treated as
non-commercial because its purpose is clearly public and supported
by raison d'Etat, such as the procurement of armaments for the de-
fence of a State, materials for the construction of a naval base, food
supplies to feed a population, relieve famine or revitalize a vulnerable
area, or medicaments to combat a spreading epidemic, provided that
it is the practice of that State to conclude such contracts or transac-
tions for such public ends.47
This two-part test is also discussed in the commentary with regard to
financial transactions:
What is said with regard to a contract for the sale or purchase of
goods or the supply of services applies equally to other types of com-
mercial contracts .... For instance, a contract of loan to make such a
purchase or a contract of guarantee for such a loan could be non-com-
45. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 27.
46. Id. at 76.
47. [Emphasis added] See Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 77, U. Doc. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in [1983]
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter 1983
Int'l L. Comm'n, Part 1].
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mercial in character, having regard ultimately also to the public pur-
pose for which the contract of purchase was concluded. For example, a
contract of guarantee for a loan to purchase military aircraft would
usually be non-commercial because of its presumably public
purpose.48
This approach introduces an element of uncertainty and instability,
rather than clarifying and unifying the law of state immunity, by creating
a self-judging standard under which a state may challenge a finding of
commercial character pursuant to the nature test by alleging the rele-
vance of a public purpose in its own state practice. This highly subjective
test would involve the courts in the difficult task of determining the mo-
tive, intent or purpose of a state in entering into a transaction or engag-
ing in a course of conduct. It would require consideration of public mo-
tives based on the proper role of a state which varies in different legal
systems. Furthermore, every action taken by a state arguably advances
some public good or governmental purpose. Thus a self-judging, subjec-
tive test could prevent private persons from resorting to the courts to
obtain relief for claims arising out of doing business with foreign states
because purely commercial transactions could inevitably be found to
serve some public good. This would seriously undermine the ability to
enforce commercial contracts with foreign states and therefore, would re-
duce substantially the trading activities between states and private
parties.
A subjective standard was soundly rejected by the Special Rap-
porteur who initially proposed an objective test. As explained in his
report:
The activity or course of conduct or a particular act attributable to a
foreign State should not be determined by reference to its motivation
or purpose. An act performed for a State is inevitably designed to ac-
complish a purpose which is in a domain closely associated with the
State itself or the public at large. In the ultimate analysis, reference to
the purpose or motive of an activity of a foreign government is there-
fore not helpful in distinguishing the types of activity which could be
regarded as commercial from those which are non-commercial. The
present article proposes a reference to the nature of the activity or the
character of the transaction or act. If it is commercial in nature, the
activity can be regarded as a trading or commercial activity. Further
reference to the purpose which motivated the activity could serve to
obscure its true character. The purpose could best be overlooked in
determining whether an activity is commercial or not, especially for
the purpose of deciding upon the availability or applicability of State
immunity.49
As the Special Rapporteur points out, considering the purpose of
state conduct presents practical difficulties. The two-pronged approach
48. Id. at 78.
49. Documents of the 32nd Session, supra note 44.
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contained in article 3(2) introduces a self-judging element and creates un-
certainty by providing for alternative nature or purpose tests. It is incon-
sistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory accepted by
most states and with existing state practice. The state immunity statutes
of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom
do not expressly provide a method for determining the commercial char-
acter of state conduct. However, the definitions of commercial transac-
tions or activities contained in the statutes focus on the objective charac-
ter of transactions relating to goods, services, trade or financial
arrangements without any reference to a commercial or a public purpose.
Similarly, the European Convention immunity exception for proceedings
relating to commercial activity focuses on the industrial, commercial or
financial nature of the activity without mentioning its purpose. The Ca-
nadian law expressly defines commercial activity as conduct "that by rea-
son of its nature is of a commercial character." The FSIA also clearly
adheres to the objective nature test: "The commercial character of an ac-
tivity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of con-
duct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its pur-
pose. '"" The subjective test for determining commercial character
provisionally adopted by the Commission in article 3(2) is a serious flaw
in the ILC draft which should be addressed during the second reading.
Article 3(1) contains an interpretative provision concerning the term
"state" as it is used in the draft.5 ' As indicated in the commentary, this
provision is designed to:
[i]dentify those entities or persons entitled to invoke the immunity of
the State where a State can claim immunity and also to identify cer-
tain instrumentalities and subdivisions of a State that are entitled to
invoke immunity when performing acts in the exercise of sovereign
authority. Accordingly, in the context of the present articles, the ex-
pression "State" should be understood as comprehending all types or
categories of entities and individuals so identified which may benefit
from the protection of State immunity.2
Under article 3, a state, for the purpose of jurisdictional immunities,
includes: 1) the state and its various organs of government; 2) political
subdivisions which exercise the sovereign authority of the state; 3) state
agencies and instrumentalities to the extent that they perform sovereign
functions for the state; and 4) state representatives acting in their official
capacity. 3 While a state and its branches of government are clearly enti-
tled to assert a claim of state immunity, other state entities or representa-
tives may present a claim of immunity only to the extent that they exer-
cise the sovereign authority of the state. This functional limitation is
discussed in the commentary with regard to agencies and
50. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41, at 33, 34.
51. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 10.
52. Id. at 27-28.
53. Id. at 10.
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instrumentalities:
The third category embraces the agencies and instrumentalities of the
State but only in so far as they are entitled to perform acts in the
exercise of "prerogatives de la puissance publique." Beyond or
outside the sphere of acts performed by them in the exercise of the
sovereign authority of the State, they do not enjoy any jurisdictional
immunity."
The European Convention does not define a state for purposes of ju-
risdictional immunities. The state immunity statutes include the state
and its organs of government in the definition of a state, but vary with
regard to state representatives, political subdivisions, and state entities.
With the exception of the FSIA which does not include state representa-
tives, the other statutes limit state immunity to the sovereign or head of
state acting in a public capacity. The Australian, Canadian and U.S. stat-
utes recognize state immunity for political subdivisions without expressly
requiring an ability to exercise the sovereign authority of the state. In
contrast, the laws of Pakistan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom do
not recognize state immunity for political subdivisions. Canada recognizes
state immunity for any agency of a foreign state defined as "any legal
entity that is an organ of the foreign state but that is separate from the
foreign state." Australia expressly excludes separate entities of a foreign
state from its state immunity statute. The laws of Pakistan, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom also expressly exclude separate state entities,
unless the proceedings relate to the exercise of sovereign authority and a
state would be immune under the circumstances. The FSIA recognizes
state immunity for a separate legal entity if it is an organ of or principally
owned by a state or a political subdivision. Thus the state immunity stat-
utes do not present clear and consistent guidance on this aspect of state
immunity.5
The concept of the state as outlined by the Commission for the pur-
pose of jurisdictional immunities captures the essence of the principle of
state immunity and its foundation in the dignity, equality and indepen-
dence of sovereign states by limiting the state entities entitled to assert
immunity to those authorized to exercise the sovereign authority of the
state. This is consistent with international law which confers upon the
state as represented by the national government the requisite legal per-
sonality for acquiring rights and duties, including the right to invoke
state immunity. While questions will inevitably arise as to whether a par-
ticular state entity exercises sovereign authority, this definition clearly
excludes a purely commercial enterprise or ship owned by a state.
54. Id. at 29.
55. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), & 1441(d).
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D. Non-retroactivity: Article 5
The ILC draft would apply to a proceeding against a state in the
court of another state only if the articles have entered into force for both
states at the time the proceeding is instituted.6 The non-retroactive ap-
plication of the jurisdictional immunities articles could be measured from
various points in time, including when the claim arises or when the suit is
filed. As indicated in the commentary: "The Commission has decided to
select a time which is relatively precise, namely that the principle of non-
retroactivity applies to proceedings instituted prior to the entry into force
of the said articles as between the States concerned."57 The principle of
non-retroactivity reflected in article 5 is consistent with the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. 8
VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. State Immunity: Article 6
The ILC draft contains a general statement of the principle of state
immunity in article 6 which provides as follows: "A State enjoys immu-
nity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the
courts of State subject to the provisions of the present articles [and the
relevant rules of general international law]." '
The commentary traces the historical development of state immu-
nity, noting the importance of the related immunities enjoyed by the local
sovereign, foreign sovereigns or heads of state, and ambassadors.6 It also
recognizes the various theories concerning the nature of state immunity,
while clearly rejecting the notion of absolute immunity for a state and its
property:
Some think that immunity constitutes an exception to the principle of
territorial sovereignty of the State of the forum and as such should be
substantiated in each case. Others refer to State immunity as a gen-
eral rule or general principle of international law. This rule is not ab-
solute in any event since unqualified of all the theories of immunity
admits one important exception, namely, consent which also forms the
basis for other principles of international law. Others still adhere to
the theory that the rule of State immunity is a unitary rule and is
inherently subject to existing limitations. Both immunity and non-im-
munity are part of the same rule. In other words, immunity exists to-
56. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Documents of the Con-
ference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 at 287 (1969).
59. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
60. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 142-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1980 Int'l L.
Comm'n].
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gether with its innate qualifications and limitations. 1
The limited principle of state immunity in article 6 is consistent with the
European Convention and the state immunity statutes.
62
Under article 6, the principle of state immunity is subject to the rele-
vant rules of international law. 3 According to the commentary, this is to
ensure the future development of customary international law based on
the judicial, executive and legislative practice of states. 4 When Chief Jus-
tice Marshall wrote The Schooner Exchange decision in 1812,6" he could
not have imagined the myriad of activities which states are engaged in
today from developing technology to mine the resources of the deep sea-
bed to producing'energy in nuclear power plants and launching communi-
cation satellites. The ILC draft should not be interpreted so as to fore-
close the development of the principle of state immunity in response to
the future activities of states.
The controversy over providing for the future development of the
customary law of state immunity, which explains the brackets in article 6,
is the result of the conflict between states that favor an absolute rule of
immunity subject only to limited exceptions expressly agreed to in the
articles and those that favor a restrictive theory of immunity for sover-
eign or governmental functions. If the ILC draft is viewed as recognizing
a general rule of immunity subject only to the exceptions enumerated in
the convention, a state whose court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign
state with regard to other nongovernmental activities may be considered
to have violated international law. This interpretation of the ILC draft
would seriously undermine the functional approach to the jurisdictional
immunities of states and their property which is the essence of restrictive
state immunity. In contrast, the reference to general international law
provides for the continuing development of the law of state immunity in
accordance with the provisions of the draft convention and in response to
cases not addressed in the draft articles.
B. Modalities for Giving Effect to State Immunity: Article 7
Under article 7, a state must give effect to the principle of state im-
munity "by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before
its courts against another state."6 the ILC commentary recognizes that,
"[tihere are various ways in which a State can be impleaded or implicated
in litigation or a legal proceeding before the court of another State. 61 7
61. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 35.
62. 196 AusTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604; European Convention, supra note 20.
63. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
64. Id. at 35-36.
65. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
66. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 12.
67. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 37 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 202, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982), reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
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Article 7 applies to any proceeding which would in effect compel a state
to submit to jurisdiction or potentially affect the rights, interests or activ-
ities of the state. It also covers a lawsuit instituted against a state organ,
representative, agency, instrumentality or political subdivision concerning
the exercise of the sovereign authority of the state.
The European Convention and the laws of Canada, Pakistan, Singa-
pore, South Africa and the United Kingdom expressly provide that a
court must give effect to the principle of state immunity by declining to
exercise jurisdiction even if the foreign state does not appear in the pro-
ceedings. The FSIA provides that a "foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States" ex-
cept as provided in the statute.6" Thus a court is precluded from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign state which is entitled to immunity. How-
ever, as explained in the FSIA commentary, this jurisdictional immunity
is viewed as an affirmative defense which must be established by the for-
eign state:
[The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] starts from a premise of im-
munity and then creates exceptions to the general principle. The
chapter is thus cast in a manner consistent with the way in which the
law of sovereign immunity has developed. Stating the basic principle
in terms of immunity may be of some advantage to foreign states in
doubtful cases, but since sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense
which must be specially pleaded,the burden will remain on the foreign
state to produce evidence in support of its claim of immunity.69
Article 7 imposes a legal obligation on a forum state to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction in the presence of immunity as provided in the ILC
draft, without defining the obligation, if any, of a foreign state to invoke
or establish this immunity. The articles which outline the exceptions to
state immunity, or the cases in which a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state, are all phrased in terms of the inability of a foreign
state to invoke immunity. 0 Therefore, if these limitations do not apply, a
foreign state may invoke the principle of state immunity. A foreign state
is clearly in the best position to invoke and establish its claim of immu-
nity, especially with regard to the activities of various state agencies and
instrumentalities. The ILC draft does not address this procedural aspect
of the law of state immunity which may vary based on the domestic law
of each state.
COMM'N 101, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1982 Int'l L.
Comm'n].
68. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), & 1441(d); European Convention, supra note 20.
69. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
70. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 14-20.
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C. Express Consent: Article 8
The ILC draft recognizes the absence of state immunity based on the
express consent of a state in an international agreement, a written con-
tract, or a declaration before a court in a specific case.7 1 As explained in
the commentary, this provision is included with the general principles in
Part II, rather than with the immunity exceptions contained in Part III:
Any formulation of the doctrine of State immunity or its corollary is
incomplete without reference to the notion of consent, or rather the
lack of consent, as a constitutive element of State immunity or the
correlative duty to refrain from subjecting another State to local juris-
diction. The existence, expression or proof of consent of the State in
litigation is extinctive of immunity itself and not in any sense an ex-
ception thereto.72
The ILC commentary also explains that consent to jurisdiction under
article 8 extends to the initial proceeding and any related review process,
but not to the enforcement of a judgment which is considered a separate
and distinct aspect of state immunity:
Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court
of another State covers the exercise of jurisdiction by appellate courts
in any subsequent stage of the proceeding up to and including the
decision of the court of final instance, retrial and review, but not exe-
cution of judgement.
73
Article 8 is consistent with the European Convention and the state
immunity laws which deny immunity if a state expressly consents to ju-
risdiction or waives its immunity. The laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom expressly provide that a choice of law
clause does not constitute submission to jurisdiction or a waiver of immu-
nity. This issue is not addressed in ILC article 8. The Canadian and U.S.
statutes prevent a foreign state from withdrawing a waiver except in ac-
cordance with its terms.7 As explained in the FSIA commentary:
The language, "notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver," is designed to exclude a withdrawal of the
waiver both after and before a dispute arises except in accordance
with the terms of the original waiver. In other words, if the foreign
state agrees to a waiver of sovereign immunity in a contract, that
waiver may subsequently be withdrawn only in a manner consistent
with the expression of the waiver in the contract. Some court deci-
sions have allowed subsequent and unilateral rescissions of waivers by
foreign states. But the better view, and the one followed in this sec-
71. Id. at 12.
72. 1982 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 67, at 239.
73. Id. at 243.
74. 196 AuSTL. ACTS. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b) & 1441(d); European Convention, supra note 20.
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tion, is that a foreign state which has induced a private person into a
contract by promising not to invoke its immunity cannot, when a dis-
pute arises, go back on its promise and seek to revoke the waiver
unilaterally.7"
The ability of a state to withdraw a waiver of immunity or consent to
jurisdiction contained in a written agreement is not addressed in the ILC
draft, though the commentary to article 22 concerning consent to jurisdic-
tion over state property recognizes that this consent can only be with-
drawn in accordance with its terms. 6 It would be useful to include a pro-
vision in the ILC draft confirming this limitation which is consistent with
the general principle of pacta sunt servanda recognized in customary in-
ternational law.
77
D. Implied Consent: Article 9
The ILC draft recognizes the absence of immunity based on implied
consent in article 9. Article 9 provides that a state cannot invoke immu-
nity in a proceeding if it has instituted, intervened in, or taken steps re-
lating to the merits of the proceeding, except when a state intervenes for
the sole purpose of invoking immunity or asserting a right or interest in
property which is at issue in the proceeding. 8 The failure of a state to
appear in a proceeding does not constitute consent.
7 9
The implied consent exception in article 9 is consistent with existing
state practice, including the FSIA which contains a general exception for
implicit waivers of immunity. The European Convention and the laws of
Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United
Kingdom expressly provide that a state which institutes, intervenes in, or
takes steps in a proceeding is deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction or
waived its immunity, unless the state acts merely to invoke immunity or
claim an interest in property.8 0
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Canada, Paki-
stan and the United Kingdom preserve the immunity of a state which
takes steps in a proceeding in ignorance of facts entitling it to immunity
if the facts were not reasonably ascertainable and the state claims immu-
nity as soon as reasonably practicable. The ILC draft does not address
this issue. As a matter of equity, this type of provision, which has been
accepted by several states, should be considered during the second read-
ing of the draft.
75. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
76. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 12-13, Y.B. at 18-19.
77. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 59, at Art. 23.
78. 1986 Int'l L.Comm'n, supra note 21, Y.B. at 9.
79. Id.
80. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C §1605 (a)(11); European Convention, supra note 20.
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E. Counterclaims: Article 10
Under article 10, a state which has instituted or intervened in a pro-
ceeding cannot invoke immunity with regard to counterclaims arising out
of the same legal relationship or set of facts as the claim put forward by
the state. The article also provides that a state which makes a counter-
claim cannot invoke immunity with regard to the principal claim.8 '
The immunity exception for related counterclaims contained in arti-
cle 10 is consistent with the European Convention and the state immu-
nity statutes of the various countries.8 2 The European Convention and
the FSIA also deny immunity for independent counterclaims for which a
state would not be entitled to immunity if the claim were filed as a sepa-
rate proceeding. The ILC commentary recognizes the absence of immu-
nity for this type of counterclaim, which is not expressly mentioned in
article 10:
Where the rules of the State of the forum so permit, article 10, para-
graph 1, also applies in the case where a counter-claim is made against
a State, and that State could not, in accordance with the provisions of
the present articles, notably in part III, invoke immunity from juris-
diction in respect of that counter-claim, had separate proceedings
been brought against the State in those courts. Thus independent
counter-claims, arising out of different transactions or occurrences not
forming part of the subject matter of the claim or arising out of a
distinct legal relationship or separate facts from those of the principal
claim, may not be maintained against the plaintiff State, unless they
fall within the scope of one of the admissible exceptions.... In other
words, independent counter-claims or cross-actions may be brought
against a plaintiff State only when separate proceedings are available
against that State under other parts of the present articles, whether or
not the State has instituted a proceeding as in paragraph 1, or has
intervened to present a claim as in paragraph 2 of article 10.11
A party to a lawsuit may wish to bring an unrelated counterclaim
against a foreign state that is participating in a proceeding to avoid the
time and expense associated with bringing a separate action. If a foreign
state is not entitled to invoke immunity with regard to a claim, then the
principle of state immunity does not provide any basis for excluding it as
an unrelated counterclaim. In the interest of fairness and the efficient ad-
ministration of justice, a private party should be allowed to present a
counterclaim against a foreign state which has either instituted or inter-
vened in a lawsuit. Article 10 should thus be amended to expressly in-
clude independent counterclaims which are not entitled to immunity.
The ILC commentary indicates that some jurisdictions limit counter-
81. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 13-14, Y.B. at 9.
82. 196 AusTL. AcTs. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20; 28 U.S.C. §1607(b).
83. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 24.
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claims against foreign states to the kind or amount of relief sought by the
foreign state. The commentary specifically refers to the FSIA as an exam-
ple.84 In fact, the FSIA creates a separate state immunity exception for
counterclaims which would merely operate as a set-off."5 As discussed in
the commentary to the FSIA:
Third, notwithstanding that the foreign state may be immune under
subsections (a) and (b), the foreign state nevertheless would not be
immune from a counterclaim to the extent that the counterclaim
seeks relief neither exceeding in amount nor differing in kind from
that sought by the foreign state. Subsection (c) codifies the rule enun-
ciated in National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). 88
The limitation discussed in the ILC commentary, which is not in-
cluded in the draft articles, would make it possible for a state to initiate
or intervene in a proceeding while limiting the extent of its own liability
as a result of counterclaims. State immunity does not provide any basis
for such a limitation. A foreign state which presents a claim has con-
sented to the court's jurisdiction over the matter, including related claims
made by other parties. If a private party responds with an unrelated
counterclaim which is not entitled to immunity, there is no justification
for limiting the foreign state's liability for the claim. It would be inequita-
ble to allow a foreign state to use the local courts to seek redress for its
claims and at the same time limit the extent to which it is amenable to
jurisdiction for either related counterclaims or independent counterclaims
which are not entitled to immunity.
It is unlikely that states favoring a more absolute theory of immunity
would agree to subject a foreign state to unrelated counterclaims which
do not fall within the exceptions enumerated in the ILC articles. These
counterclaims would thus be able to arise out of sovereign or governmen-
tal activities, as a set off against the foreign state's claim. There is no
counterpart to the FSIA set off provision in the European Convention or
the other state immunity statutes. In this regard, the FSIA exceeds the
restrictive theory which provides immunity for claims relating to govern-
mental functions whether the claims are presented in separate proceed-
ings or as counterclaims. Nonetheless, the United States should clarify
the position of the FSIA on this issue.
VII. [LIMITATIONS ON] [EXCEPTIONS TO] STATE IMMUNITY
The tension between the competing theories of restrictive and abso-
lute immunity is reflected in the alternative bracketed language in the
heading of this section which contains provisions indicating when a state
is not entitled to invoke immunity. 7 The selection of one of these titles
84. Id.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c).
86. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
87. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 14, Y.B. at 10.
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would affect the interpretation of the draft articles as a whole either by
endorsing a restrictive principle of immunity subject to inherent limita-
tions or an absolute rule of immunity subject to an exhaustive list of
exceptions.
A convention on the jurisdictional immunities of states which would
establish a general rule of immunity without regard to the nature of the
functions performed by a state would clearly be inconsistent with restric-
tive state immunity as recognized by the majority of states and codified
in the FSIA." The majority of states and codified in the FSIA. It is im-
portant that every state retain its inherent sovereign right to exercise ju-
risdiction over foreign citizens or states which engage in nongovernmental
activities within the jurisdiction of the state. As discussed in The
Schooner Exchange decision, the national jurisdiction of courts is an
equally important attribute of state sovereignty and independence which
cannot be restricted without the consent of the state.89 The underlying
principles of sovereign independence, equality and dignity which justify
refraining from exercising jurisdiction under the principle of state immu-
nity only apply to cases which implead a foreign state with regard to its
sovereign acts. Any attempt to extend this restraint on the valid exercise
of jurisdiction beyond the functional limitations of state immunity would
exceed the principles which justify this immunity and would be inconsis-
tent with the clearly restrictive trend in state practice.
The future of the ILC articles depends upon the Commission's abil-
ity to accommodate the restrictive and absolute theories of immunity
which influence the domestic laws of different countries. A possible com-
promise would be to view the ILC articles in the context of the applicabil-
ity or the nonapplicability of the principle of state immunity. Thus the
principle of state immunity would apply to a case impleading a foreign
state with regard to its sovereign functions. In contrast, the principle
would not apply to a case concerning the non-sovereign activities of a
state. Using the neutral phrase "Nonapplicability of State Immunity"
would avoid the acceptance or the rejection of either theory and would
allow the principle to continue to develop in response to the future activi-
ties of states.
A. Article 11: Commercial Contracts
A state which enters into a commercial contract with a foreign indi-
vidual or corporation is considered to have consented to jurisdiction with
regard to disputes arising out of the contract and thus cannot claim im-
munity under article 11.90 Subsequent ILC articles provide additional ex-
88. See Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of the States and Their Property,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/376 at para. 39, reprinted in [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 5, at 14, U.N.
Sales No. E.85.V.7 (Part I)(1985).
89. 11 U.S. (Cranch 7) at 136.
90. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §1602.
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ceptions for particular types of commercial conduct, such as employment
contracts or participation in a corporate entity.
The reference to implied consent in article 11 is consistent with the
absolute theory of immunity, but unnecessary for purposes of the restric-
tive theory. This language is discussed in the commentary:
It is the result of continuing efforts to accommodate the differing
viewpoints of those who are prepared to admit an exception to the
general rule of State immunity in the field of trading or commercial
activities, based upon the theory of implied consent, or on other
grounds, and those who take the position that a plea of State immu-
nity cannot be invoked to set aside the jurisdiction of the local courts
where a foreign State engages in trading or commercial activities.'
Incorporating the notion of implied consent would not limit the exception
for commercial contracts. Nonetheless, the Commission has endeavored
to avoid favoring one theory of immunity over another. It would be con-
sistent with the other ILC articles to simply provide that a state cannot
invoke immunity with regard to commercial conduct without referring to
the theoretical basis for the exception.
The commercial contract exception in article 11 does not apply to
contracts between states or governments.9" The commentary explains this
limitation with reference to the trading practices of developing countries
and socialist states:
It is a well-known fact that developing countries often conclude trad-
ing contracts with other States, while socialist States also engage in
direct State-trading not only among themselves, but also with other
States, both in the developing world and with the highly sophisticated
industrialized countries."8
State immunity has developed in response to lawsuits brought by private
parties against foreign states. Conflicts between states or governments are
not settled in national courts.
A commercial contract in which the parties expressly agree to certain
dispute settlement procedures would also be excluded from article 11."
As explained in the commentary:
Subparagraph (b) leaves a State party to a commercial contract com-
plete freedom to provide for a different solution or method of settle-
ment of differences relating to the contract. A State may expressly
agree in the commercial contract itself, or through subsequent negoti-
ations, to arbitration or other methods of amicable settlement such as
conciliation, good offices or mediation. Any such express agreement
would normally be in writing.9"
91. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 25.
92. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 15, Y.B. at 10.
93. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 26.
94. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 15, Y.B. at 10.
95. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 41, Y.B. at 26.
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This is consistent with the general principle of freedom of contract.
The absence of state immunity for claims relating to commercial con-
duct or contractual obligations is recognized in the European Convention
and the state immunity statutes. The European Convention denies state
immunity if the proceeding relates to a contractual obligation to be per-
formed in the territory of the forum state, unless the contract is between
states, the parties have otherwise agreed in writing, or the contract was
concluded by a state in its territory and is governed by its administrative
law. The European Convention contains a separate immunity exception
for claims relating to the industrial, financial or commercial activities of a
foreign state carried out by an office, agency or establishment in the fo-
rum state, unless all of the parties to the dispute are states or the parties
have otherwise agreed. The Canadian statute contains a general immu-
nity exception for any proceeding relating to any commercial activity of a
foreign state. Australian law recognizes a state immunity exception for
proceedings concerning a commercial transaction, unless the parties to
the proceeding are foreign states or have otherwise agreed in writing. The
laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom pre-
vent a state from claiming immunity in a proceeding relating to a com-
mercial transaction or a contractual obligation to be performed in whole
or in part in the forum, unless the parties to the dispute are states or the
parties have otherwise agreed in writing. In the United Kingdom, Singa-
pore, and Pakistan the state immunity exception for contractual obliga-
tions does not extend to noncommercial contracts made in the territory of
the state concerned and governed by its administrative law."
The FSIA contains a detailed state immunity exception for claims
relating to commercial activity, including: 1) commercial activity carried
on in the United States; 2) an act performed in the United States in con-
nection with commercial forty-two activity elsewhere; or 3) an act outside
of the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere
which has a direct effect in the United States."7 As explained in the com-
mentary, this includes commercial acts other than contracts:
Examples of this type of situation might include: a representation in
the United States by an agent of a foreign state that leads to an action
for restitution based on unjust enrichment; an act in the United
States that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations; the wrongful
discharge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state who
has been employed in connection with a commercial activity carried
on in some third country .... It should be noted that the acts (or
omissions) encompassed in this category are limited to those which in
and of themselves are sufficient to form the basis of a cause of
action."
96. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20, at 4, 7.
97. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).
98. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
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It is important to note the broad jurisdictional implications of the
commercial activity exception contained in section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA
which includes: "an act outside of the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity elsewhere [which] causes a direct
effect in the United States."99 The FSIA commentary discusses this juris-
diction over foreign commercial activity which has a substantial contact
with the United States:
[A] commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
state would include not only a commercial transaction performed and
executed in its entirety in the United States, but also a commercial
transaction or act having a "substantial contact" with the United
States. This definition includes cases based on commercial transac-
tions performed in whole or in part in the United States, import-ex-
port transactions involving sales to, or purchases from, concerns in the
United States, business torts occurring in the United States... and,
an indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which negotiates or exe-
cutes a loan agreement in the United States, or which receives financ-
ing from a private or public lending institution located in the United
States (e.g. loans, guarantees. or insurance provided by the Export-
Import Bank of the United States). It will be for the courts to deter-
mine whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in
whole or in part in the United States. This definition, however, is in-
tended to reflect a degree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by
U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff.'"
The commercial activity exception is one of the most important as-
pects of the restrictive theory of state immunity because of the substan-
tial commercial interaction between states and private parties which may
give rise to litigation. It is conceivable that a state which incurred some
type of obligation or liability as a result of commercial activity other than
a contract would be entitled to immunity under the commercial contract
exception in the ILC draft and not the commercial activity or commercial
transaction exception contained in the European Convention and the
state immunity statutes.
Efforts to restrict this exception to commercial contracts may be the
result of concerns which relate to jurisdiction rather than to state immu-
nity. Many states reject the direct effects doctrine which is reflected in
the FSIA commercial activity exception. In fact, the jurisdiction issue has
been raised in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly:
A suggestion was made in the course of the debate in the Sixth Com-
mittee that in order to exercise jurisdiction a link should be estab-
lished under article 11 [commercial activity exception] between the
State of the forum and the State against which a proceeding is insti-
tuted, such as the existence in the territory of the State of the forum
of an office or bureau to conduct the business or commercial transac-
99. 28 U.S.C. §1605 (a)(2).
100. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
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tions on behalf of the foreign State concerned. Reference to the appli-
cable rules of private international law regulating the question of ju-
risdiction of the courts of the territorial State has been regarded
generally as providing adequate assurance of an existing connection
which could be territorial or else jurisdiction could be established by
mutual consent of the parties to the contract. Another view has since
been expressed to the effect that apart from consent in the case of
forum prorogatum, there should also be a genuine territorial connec-
tion to enable the court to exercise jurisdiction in regard to the com-
mercial contract in question. The possibility of further improvement
of the text of article 11 will be re-examined on second reading." 1
The commercial contract exception, as provisionally adopted by the
Commission in article 11, expressly refers to differences relating to a com-
mercial contract which "by virtue of the applicable rules of private inter-
national law" fall within the jurisdiction of the state.0 2 The ILC draft
does not affect the requirements for jurisdiction under internal or inter-
national law for claims relating to commercial contracts or any other mat-
ter. While the ILC commentary recognizes the close relationship between
issues of jurisdiction and immunity, the draft articles are clearly limited
to the question of immunity:
The first prerequisite to any question involving jurisdictional immu-
nity is therefore the existence of a valid "jurisdiction," primarily
under internal law rules of a State, and, in the ultimate analysis, the
assumption and exercise of such jurisdiction not conflicting with any
basic norms of public international law. It is then and only then that
the applicability of State immunity may come into play. There ap-
pears to be a close relationship between the existence of valid jurisdic-
tion on the matter under consideration by the court and the conse-
quential possibility of a claim of jurisdictional immunity. Without
evidence of valid jurisdiction, there is no necessity to proceed to initi-
ate, let alone substantiate, any claim of State immunity. It should,
however, be emphasized that the Commission is not concerned in the
consideration of this topic with the compatibility with general inter-
national law of a State's internal law on the extent of jurisdiction." 3
As indicated in the commentary, a foreign state has the right to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of a court independently of any claim of immunity.
Nonetheless, some states may wish to avoid the appearance of accepting
the more expansive jurisdictional rules of other states. Given the disa-
greement within the international community on the rules of interna-
tional law which circumscribe the jurisdiction of a state, it may be useful
101. 1986 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at 14, Y.B. at 10.
102. Id.
103. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
work of its Thirty-Fourth Session (3 May-23 July 1982) [hereinafter, 1982 Int'l L.
Comm'n], 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) after para. 198, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982), re-
printed in [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 101, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part
2), U.N. Sales No. E. 83.V.3 (Part III)(1983).
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for the Commission to address this issue at some future time. However,
jurisdictional issues which have not been addressed by the Commission
should not be allowed to interfere with the draft articles on state immu-
nity. If Member States are concerned about the effect that the draft arti-
cles may have on the question of jurisdiction, the Commission should
consider adding a general provision expressly stating that the articles do
not in any way affect the rules of international law which govern jurisdic-
tion. With regard to article 11, it is important that the ILC draft recog-
nize that the principle of state immunity does not preclude a state from
exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state for a claim arising out of com-
mercial activity which does not result in a contract. This would be consis-
tent with the European Convention, the state immunity statutes, and the
broader trading and commercial activity exception initially proposed by
the special Rapporteur based on state practice.0 4
B. Article 12: Employment Contracts
Under article 12, a state cannot invoke immunity for a claim relating
to an employment contract if: 1) the services are to be performed in the
forum state; 2) the employee has been recruited in that state; and 3) the
employee is covered by the social security laws of the forum.' This ex-
ception applies only if the employee is a national or habitual resident of
the forum state when the employment contract is concluded and is not a
national of the employer state at the time the proceeding is instituted.
According to the commentary, this exception to state immunity "applies
to matters arising out of the terms and conditions contained in the con-
tract of employment. '"10 6 Article 12 expressly excludes proceedings which
relate to recruitment, employment renewal or reinstatement. It also ex-
cludes contracts in which the parties have expressly agreed to dispute set-
tlement procedures, subject to the public policy considerations of the fo-
rum state.'0 7 As discussed in connection with the commercial contract
exception in article 11, dispute settlement provisions are considered an
element of freedom of contract.
Every state has a strong interest in regulating labor conditions and
the treatment of employees within its territory, regardless of whether the
employee is recruited in the forum state, a citizen or habitual resident, or
covered by the social security laws. These regulations may incorporate
broad policy decisions with regard to child or forced labor, as well as the
particular terms of employment such as minimum wage or maximum
104. See 1980 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 44, Y.B., at 6-8.
105. 1986 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at, 11 Y.B. at 10.
106. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session (7 May-27 July 1984) [hereinafter 1984 INT'L L. COMM'N],
39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 6) after 214, U.N. Doc. A/39/10 (1984), reprinted in [1984] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1(Part 2), U.N. Sales No.
E.85.V.7 (Part II) (1985).
107. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 16, Y.B. at 10.
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hours. Foreign employers who wish to have employment contracts per-
formed in another state cannot reasonably expect to dictate the terms of
employment free from the constraints of the local law and thereby cir-
cumvent domestic labor policies.
The ILC commentary on the exception for employment contracts
recognizes the competing interests of the employer state and the state
where the contract is to be performed:
The employer State has an interest in the application of its adminis-
trative law in regard to the selection, recruitment and appointment of
an employee by the State or one of its organs, agencies or instrumen-
talities acting in the exercise of governmental authority. It would also
seem justifiable that, for the exercise of disciplinary supervision over
its own staff or government employees, the employer State has an
overriding interest in ensuring compliance with its internal adminis-
trative regulations and the prerogative of appointment or dismissal
which results from unilateral decisions taken by the State. On the
other hand, the State of the forum appears to retain exclusive juris-
diction if not, indeed, an overriding interest in matters of domestic
public policy regarding the protection to be afforded to its local labour
force, including enforcement of its social security provisions and en-
hancement of contributions to social security funds. Questions relat-
ing to medical insurance, insurance against certain risks, minimum
wages, entitlement to rest and recreation, vacation with pay, compen-
sation to be paid on termination of the contract of employment, etc.,
are of primary concern to the State of the forum .... 108
It is important to distinguish between the employees of a foreign
state who are authorized to perform acts on behalf of the state and em-
ployees who merely provide services that assist the foreign state in carry-
ing out its functions. The ILC draft expressly excludes from the scope of
the articles employees or agents that perform diplomatic or consular
functions. 0 9 The employment contract exception in article 12 does not
apply to employees that have been "recruited to perform services associ-
ated with the exercise or governmental authority." 1 This distinction is
consistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory of state
immunity which recognizes immunity for sovereign or governmental ac-
tivities. There is no justification for granting immunity to a foreign state
with regard to employment contracts if the employee is not authorized to
perform governmental acts on behalf of the state. The important criterion
for purposes of state immunity is whether the services to be performed in
the forum state involve the exercise of governmental authority, not
whether the employee is a citizen or is covered by the social security laws.
The European Convention prevents a state from claiming immunity
in a proceeding concerning an employment contract to be performed in
108. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 64.
109. See INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at 11, Y.B. at 9.
110. Id. at 15, Y.B. at 10.
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the forum state, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in writing, the
individual was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the forum
state when the contract was made or is a national of the employing state
when the proceedings are instituted. The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Sin-
gapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom contain similar provisions
concerning contracts either made or to be performed in the forum state.
All of the laws, except South Africa's statute, also provide that the claim
may relate to the contract or to statutory rights or obligations arising
under forum law. The Australian and South African statutes expressly
exclude diplomats and consular offices from the employment contract
exception."'
The laws of Canada and the United States do not include a separate
exception for employment contracts. However, this type of contract
would fall under the broad commercial activity exception contained in the
state immunity statutes.'"2 The FSIA commentary expressly characterizes
as commercial activity not entitled to immunity "employment or engage-
ment of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents.""' 3
It also specifically refers to the absence of immunity for actions relating
to wrongful termination of employment, including "the wrongful dis-
charge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state who has
been employed in connection with a commercial activity carried on in
some other country."" 4 While the reference to a third country raises a
jurisdictional issue, the important point is that claims of unlawful termi-
nation would not be subject to immunity under the FSIA. Wrongful ter-
mination claims would also be allowed under the European Convention
and the other state immunity statutes.
Some states have expressed the concern that subjecting foreign states
to local jurisdiction with regard to employment contracts may discourage
the employer State from hiring local employees." 5 Article 12 begins with
the phrase "[u]nless otherwise agreed between the States concerned." 6
Thus every state is free to exempt other states by special agreement from
the domestic labor laws or their employment contracts from the jurisdic-
tion of local courts.
It is important that the ILC draft recognize a general state immunity
exception for claims relating to employment contracts, including wrongful
termination which is of particular interest to employees, unless the con-
tract involves the performance of governmental functions or the exercise
of sovereign authority.
111. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20.
112. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605(a).
113. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
114. Id. at 13.
115. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 66.
116. 1986 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at 15, Y.B. at 10.
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C. Article 13: Personal Injuries and Damage to Property
Article 13 provides an exception to state immunity for proceedings
relating to:
[c]ompensation for death or injury to the person or damage to or loss
of tangible property if the act or omission which is alleged to be at-
tributable to the State and which caused the death, injury or damage
occurred wholly or partly in the territory of the State of the forum,
and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory
at the time of the act or omission. '
This provision requires two territorial connections. First, the person
responsible for causing the harm must be in the forum state at the time
of the relevant act or omission. Second, the act or omission which causes
the harm must occur in whole or in part in the forum state. Thus article
13 would not apply to trans-boundary harm cases, including trans-bound-
ary pollution or shots fired across a boundary.11 8 As explained in the com-
mentary, this article is "primarily concerned with accidents occurring
routinely within the territory of the state of the forum."' 1 9
Article 13 refers to a tortious act or omission which is attributable to
a state. It does not define the scope of the exception in terms of: 1) the
relationship between the person causing the injury and the foreign state;
or 2) the conduct causing the harm and the official duties of the individ-
ual on behalf of the state. These issues relate to the requirements for
establishing a tort claim which would depend upon the applicable na-
tional law of agency or tort liability.
The personal injuries and damage to property exception requires an
act or omission which causes harm. There is no requirement of wrongful
conduct or any distinction between negligent and intentional acts. As dis-
cussed in the commentary, the purpose of the exception is to allow pri-
vate parties to recover compensation from foreign states for personal in-
juries or property damages and to prevent insurance companies from
hiding behind the immunity of a foreign state:
The exception contained in this article is therefore designed to pro-
vide relief or possibility of recourse to justice for individuals who suf-
fer personal injury, death or physical damage to or loss of property by
an act or omission which might be intentional, accidental or caused by
negligence attributable to a foreign State .... Furthermore, the phys-
ical injury to the person or the damage to tangible property, resulting
in death or total loss or other lesser injury, appears to be confined
principally to insurable risks .... Essentially, the rule of non-immu-
nity will preclude the possibility of the insurance company hiding be-
hind the cloak of State immunity and evading its liability to the in-
117. Id. at 16, Y.B. at 10.
118. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 66-67.
119. Id.
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jured individuals.'20
The ILC commentary indicates that article 13 is intended to subject
foreign states to compensation claims relating to actual physical injuries:
The areas of damage envisaged in article [13] are mainly concerned
with accidental death or physical injuries to persons or damage to tan-
gible property involved in traffic accidents, such as moving vehicles,
motorcycles, locomotives, or speed boats. In other words, the article
covers most areas of accidents involved in the transport of goods or
persons by rail, road, air or waterways .... In addition, the scope of
article [13] is wide enough to cover also intentional physical harm
such as assault and battery, malicious damage to property, arson or
even homicide, including political assassination. Article [13] does not
cover cases where there is no physical damage. Damage to reputation
or defamation is not personal injury in the physical sense, nor is inter-
ference with contract rights or any rights, including economic or social
rights, damage to tangible property.' 2 '
Thus the purpose of the ILC exception for tort claims is to allow a pri-
vate party to bring a claim for actual damages caused by a foreign state.
This state immunity exception would not extend to punitive damages
which may be imposed against private individuals in some jurisdictions.
It is not clear whether article 13 would allow an injured patty to recover
for intangible losses, such as mental anguish or pain and suffering, in ad-
dition to a claim for physical damage.
Article 13 is consistent with the European Convention and the state
immunity statutes which recognize a general immunity exception for pro-
ceedings relating to personal injury or tangible property damage if the
events causing the harm occurred in the forum state. The Canadian stat-
ute refers to personal injury or damage occurring in Canada rather than
focusing on the acts causing the injury. Pakistan's statute does not in-
clude a provision concerning personal injury or property damage.'2 2 In
contrast, the FSIA contains a detailed provision denying immunity for
claims requesting compensation for: "personal injury or death, or damage
to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.' 2
The FSIA exception is limited to tortious conduct by a state official
or employee in the performance of official duties, including claims based
on strict liability. The relevant act or omission and the resulting harm
must occur in the United States. As explained in the FSIA commentary:
Section 1605(a)(5) is directed primarily at the problem of traffic acci-
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id.
122. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
123. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5).
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dents but is cast in general terms as applying to all tort actions for
money damages, not otherwise encompassed by §1605(a)(2) relating to
commercial activities. It denies immunity as to claims for personal in-
jury or death, or for damage to or loss of property, caused by the tor-
tious act or omission of a foreign state or its officials or employees,
acting within the scope of their authority; the tortious act or omission
must occur within the jurisdiction of the United States. . . . [The]
phrase "tortious act or omission" is meant to include causes of action
which are based on strict liability as well as on negligence. 1"
As in the ILC draft, the FSIA exception for noncommercial torts excludes
claims which do not involve personal injury or physical damage, such as
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights. However, the FSIA does not
preclude the possibility of obtaining money damages for pain and suffer-
ing which accompanies physical injury. The liability of a foreign state is
expressly limited to actual damages under any of the exceptions enumer-
ated in the statute, thus prohibiting a claim for punitive damages against
a foreign state.1" '
The FSIA tort exception does not apply to claims arising out of the
performance or the failure to perform discretionary functions. Preserving
the immunity of a foreign state for claims arising out of discretionary gov-
ernmental functions is consistent with the restrictive theory. A state
should not be required to explain or justify sensitive governmental deci-
sions in the national courts of another state. This important limitation is
not addressed in the European Convention, the other state immunity
statutes, or the ILC draft. However, the Commission has indicated that it
intends to include a reservation which will recognize this distinction. 26
D. Article 14: Ownership, Possession and Use of Property
Under article 14, a state cannot invoke immunity in a proceeding
which relates to: 1) a right or interest in immovable property located in
the forum state; 2) property acquired by succession, gift or bona vacantia;
or 3) property which is the subject of estate, competency, bankruptcy or
corporate dissolution proceedings. The article also refers to proceedings
which relate to the possession or use of immovable property. 27 Property
used by a state in connection with its diplomatic or consular relations
would not be covered by this article.1"8
A proceeding is considered to have been instituted against a foreign
state under article 7(3) if it is "designed to deprive that other State of its
property or of the use of property in its possession or control." 29 Article
124. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41, at 16.
125. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5), 1606.
126. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, at 67.
127. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11, Y.B. at 10.
128. Id. at 11, Y.B. at 9.
129. Id. at 12, Y.B. at 9.
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14 limits the ability of a third party to take advantage of state immunity
in this type of 'proceeding. The court is not precluded from exercising
jurisdiction if the foreign state itself would not be entitled to invoke im-
munity or in the absence of prima facie evidence of the interest or right
of the state. As explained in the commentary:
[There] would seem to be no reason to oppose such a proceeding on
the grounds of State immunity, if the State itself could not have suc-
cessfully invoked its immunity had the proceeding been brought
against it .... Paragraph 2 is also needed in view of recent legal devel-
opments regarding the effect of assertions by foreign States. At least
in the practice of some jurisdictions, it used to be the rule - far more
absolute than today - that, if a foreign sovereign said that the prop-
erty in question was his or in his possession or control the local court
was obliged to decline jurisdiction. However, the more recent practice
of the same jurisdictions now requires the foreign State to provide at
least prima facie evidence of its title or proof that the possession was
obtained in conformity with the local law. In certain circumstances,
the foreign State would be obliged to furnish evidence as to the official
status of an agency for which State immunity was invoked.'30
The European Convention and the state immunity statutes contain
similar provisions denying immunity for proceedings relating to immova-
ble property in the forum state; property acquired by gift, succession, or
bona vacantia; or property subject to judicial adminstration such as
bankruptcy or estate proceedings. The Canadian statute only refers to
property acquired by gift, succession, or bona vacantia. The South Afri-
can and United States laws do not include property under judicial admin-
istration. The South African statute expressly excludes claims relating to
diplomatic or consular property. The laws of the United Kingdom, Paki-
stan and Singapore allow a court to entertain proceedings against a third
party relating to property possessed or controlled by a state or in which a
state claims an interest if the state would not be entitled to immunity
under the circumstances or if the claim is neither admitted nor supported
by prima facie evidence. Article 14 clearly reflects existing state
practice.
13'
E. Article 15: Patents, Trademarks and Intellectual or Industrial
Property
The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for cases in-
volving intangible property rights. Under article 15, a state is not immune
from proceedings which relate to the determination of a right or an al-
leged infringement with regard to a patent, industrial design, trademark,
copyright or any other form of intellectual or industrial property.'32 As
130. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 37.
131. 196 Ausm. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(4); European Convention, supra note 20.
132. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, Y.B. at 11.
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explained in the commentary, this provision is closely related to the ex-
ceptions for commercial activity and tangible property:
The protection afforded by the internal system of registration in force
in various States is designed to promote inventiveness and creativity
and, at the same time, to regulate and secure fair competition in inter-
national trade. An infringement of a patent of invention or industrial
design or of any copyright of literary or artistic work may not always
have been motivated by commercial or financial gain, but invariably
impairs or entails adverse effects upon the commercial interests of the
manufacturer or producers who are otherwise protected for the pro-
duction and distribution of the goods involved. "Patents, trademarks
and intellectual or industrial property" in their collective nomencla-
ture constitute a highly specialized form of property rights which are
intangible or incorporeal, but which are capable of ownership, posses-
sion or use as recognized under various legal systems. 3 '
Some states expressed the view that this provision may hinder the
economic and development policies of developing countries with regard to
the transfer of technology essential for growth and development. The ILC
commentary makes an important distinction between the domestic policy
of a state within its territory and its activities in other states:
Every State, including any developing State, is free to pursue its own
policy within its own territory. Infringement of such rights in the ter-
ritory of another State, for instance the unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of copyrighted publications, cannot escape the exercise of
jurisdiction by the competent courts of that State in which measures
of protection have been adopted. The State of the forum is also
equally free to tolerate or permit such infringements or to deny reme-
dies therefore in the absence of an organized system of protection for
the rights violated or breached in its own territory.""
Thus it is for each state to decide whether to enact legislation for the
protection of intangible property rights within its territory or to enter
into treaty arrangements for the extraterritorial protection of these
rights.
A state has a strong interest in the determination of intangible prop-
erty rights which are created, protected, and regulated by domestic law.
Allowing a state to claim immunity in a proceeding initiated to settle a
dispute concerning a patent, copyright or trademark would seriously un-
dermine the often elaborate system for registering and protecting intangi-
ble property interests. It would leave the private parties in an unaccept-
able position of uncertainty concerning their property rights. Similarly, a
state which has allegedly infringed a patent, copyright or trademark by
its conduct in another state cannot reasonably expect to avoid the juris-
diction of the local courts in settling the dispute or preventing future in-
fringements. As discussed in the commentary, article 15 requires two ter-
133. Id. Y.B. at 68.
134. Id. at 69.
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ritorial connections with the forum:
First, the alleged infringement by a State of a copyright, etc., must
materialize in the territory of the State of the forum. Secondly, such a
copyright, etc., of a third person must be legally protected in the State
of the forum. Hence there is a limit to the scope of the application of
the article. Infringement of a copyright by a State in its own territory,
and not in the State of the forum, does not establish a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction in the State of the forum under this article." 5
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Sin-
gapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom recognize a similar state
immunity exception for proceedings relating to a state's interest in, or
infringement of, intangible property rights, including the right to use a
trade or business name. The Pakistan, South African, and United King-
dom statutes also refer to plant breeders' rights, a relatively new intangi-
ble property interest. Australian law preserves state immunity if the pro-
ceeding relates to goods imported into or used in Australia exclusively for
noncommercial purposes. The laws of Canada and the United States do
not provide a separate immunity exception for intangible property claims.
However, these claims would generally fall under the broad commercial
activity exceptions found in the two statutes.136
The ownership or infringement of intangible property rights is clearly
private sector activity which does not require the exercise of sovereign or
governmental authority. The ILC provision is consistent with the restric-
tive theory of state immunity and the recent trend in state practice.
F. Article 16: Fiscal Matters
Article 16 provides that a state cannot invoke immunity in a proceed-
ing which relates to a fiscal obligation, such as a duty or a tax."3 7 As dis-
cussed in the commentary, this article provides a broad exception for any
type of fiscal obligation incurred by a foreign state under the law of the
forum:
Article 16 deals with the exception to the immunity of States from
jurisdiction in respect of a proceeding regarding fiscal obligations such
as taxes, customs or excise duties for the purchase, sale or importation
of goods, including agricultural products, ad valorem stamp duties,
charges or registration fees for transfer of property registered in the
State of the forum, income tax derived from commercial activities
conducted in the State of the forum, rates or taxes on premises occu-
pied by the State for commercial purposes in the State of the forum,
or other similar charges .... It should be understood that the enu-
meration is not meant to be exhaustive: the words "similar charges"
include all other forms of duties and taxes in force in the State of the
135. Id.
136. 196 AusTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20.
137. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
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forum. 138
This exception recognizes the sovereign authority of the forum state
to tax any source of income within its territory or to impose a duty on
imports. However, it would not effect a tax exemption or reduced tariff
rate conferred upon a foreign state in an international agreement.
Private parties as well as states engage in the activities discussed in
the commentary which do not require the exercise of sovereign authority.
As noted in the commentary: "Such liabilities or obligations, which are
substantive liabilities, do not normally arise for a foreign State, except in
cases where the State establishes a business, official or commercial, or
maintains an office or agency in the territory of another State." "' It is
not clear what is meant by an "official business" of a foreign state which
would be subject to local taxes. However, the state immunity exception
would not apply to diplomatic or consular missions which are excluded
from the scope of the articles. 4"
The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the
United Kingdom deny immunity for claims relating to the tax liabilities
of a foreign state. With the exception of the Australian statute, the laws
also deny immunity for proceedings concerning customs or excise duties,
and taxes or rates imposed on premises used for commercial purposes.
The laws of Pakistan and the United Kingdom also refer to agricultural
levies. The European Convention, the Canadian and United States stat-
utes do not contain separate provisions concerning taxes or duties. How-
ever, this type of proceeding would generally fall under the broad com-
mercial activity exceptions contained in these laws."'
G. Article 17: Participation in Companies or Other Collective Bodies
The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for proceedings
which relate to the participation of a State in a corporation or other col-
lective body and the relationship between the State and the organization
or the other participants, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in
writing. 42 The entity must be incorporated under the law of the forum
state, or be controlled from or have its principal place of business in that
state. The immunity exception only applies to organizations which have
members other than states or international organizations.
This provision is intended to cover a wide variety of entities, includ-
ing corporations and nonprofit organizations. As explained in the com-
mentary, the exception applies to cases involving the rights or obligations
of a state as a participant in an organization:
138. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 69.
139. Id. at 69-70.
140. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11, Y.B. at 9.
141. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 106.
142. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
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When a State participates in a collective body, such as by acquiring or
holding shares in a company or becoming a member of a body corpo-
rate which is organized and operated in another State, it voluntarily
enters into the legal system of that other State and into a relationship
recognized as binding under that legal system. Consequently, the
State is of its own accord bound and obliged to abide by the applica-
ble rules and internal law of the State of incorporation, of registration
or of the principal place of business. The State also has rights and
obligations under the relevant provisions of the charter of incorpora-
tion, articles of association or other similar instruments establishing
limited or registered partnerships. The relationship between share-
holders inter se or between shareholders and the company or the body
of any form in matters relating to the formation, management, direc-
tion, operation, dissolution or distribution of assets of the entity in
question is governed by the law of the State of incorporation, of regis-
tration or of the principal place of business."'
When a state participates with private parties in a corporation or
other entity established under the law of the forum, it clearly steps into
the private sector. Participation in a body which exists by virtue of the
domestic law of another country does not require the exercise of sovereign
or governmental authority on the part of the foreign state. The European
Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa
and the United Kingdom deny immunity for proceedings relating to a
state's participation in a corporation or partnership established under fo-
rum law or having its principal place of business in the forum state, un-
less the parties have otherwise agreed in writing. There must be at least
one private person participating in the organization. The Canadian and
U.S. statutes do not contain separate provisions for this type of proceed-
ing which would usually come within the broad commercial activity ex-
ception contained in these laws.144
H. Article 18: State-owned or State-operated Ships Engaged in Com-
mercial Services
The ILC draft recognizes an exception for any proceeding relating to
a ship which is owned or operated by a state, or the carriage of cargo on
such a ship, if, "at the time the cause of action arose, the ship was in use
or intended exclusively for use for commercial [non-governmental] pur-
poses." '145 The term state- owned or state-operated ship includes the pos-
session, control, management or charter of a ship."' This exception may
arise in connection with various types of claims relating to, for example:
143. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 71.
144. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat/ 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20.
145. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21 at 18-19, Y.B. at 11.
146. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 40 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 154, U.N. Doc. A/40/10 (1985), reprinted in [19851 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N, U.N.. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1 (part 2). [hereinafter, 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n]
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an accident or collision; assistance, salvage or general average; or con-
tracts relating to the ship for repairs or supplies. 4" As discussed in the
commentary, the jurisdiction of the court will depend upon the law of the
forum which varies from one country to another with regard to proceed-
ings involving ships:
[the] maritime law, of the forum State . . . may recognize a wide vari-
ety of causes of action and may allow a possible choice of proceedings
such as in personam against the owner and operator or in rem against
the ship itself, or suits in admiralty or actions to enforce a maritime
lien or to foreclose a mortgage. A court may be competent on a variety
of grounds, including the presence of the ship at a port of the forum
State, and it need not be the same ship that caused damage at sea or
other liabilities but a similar merchant ship belonging to the same
owner. Courts in common law systems generally recognize the possi-
bility of arrest or seizure of a sister ship also ad fundandam jurisdic-
tionem, but once bond is posted the ship would be released and the
proceedings allowed to continue. Thus, the expression "any proceed-
ing" refers to "any type of proceeding" regardless of its nature,
whether in rem, in personam, in admiralty or otherwise." 8
Of course, a state would be entitled to assert any defense or limitation on
liability which would be available to a privately-owned ship or cargo.'4
Article 18 provides a state immunity exception for ships which are
used or "intended exclusively for use for commercial [non-governmental]
purposes.' 150 As explained in the commentary, this "intended use" ele-
ment would exclude merchant ships which a state intends to use for gov-
ernmental purposes in the future:
Thus an ordinary merchant ship may be requisitioned by a govern-
ment and converted into a warship, but, before its actual commission
or use as a man-of-war, attempts may be made to arrest or attach the
ship intended for use as a ship of war. Such arrest or attachment
would not be permitted under the test of "intended for use." Thus,
the schooner "Exchange" was not at the material time intended for




The "intended use" element also appears in article 18(4) with regard
to cargo. A state cannot invoke immunity:
in any proceeding relating to the carriage of cargo on board a ship
owned or operated by that State and engaged in commercial [non-
governmental] service provided that, at the time the cause of action
arose, the ship was in use or intended exclusively for use for commer-
147. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
148. 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146, at 156, Y.B. at 63.
149. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
150. Id.
151. 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146, at 155, Y.B. at 62-63.
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cial [non-governmental] purposes. 52
Under the functional approach of the restrictive theory, the crucial
time for characterizing the governmental or non-governmental character
of state activity is the time the cause of action arose. If a state is not
engaged in governmental activity at that time, then the claim does not
relate to governmental activity and the reasons for extending immunity
do not apply. A state should not be able to avoid liability for its commer-
cial activities by claiming that it intended to terminate these activities
and then revert that activity back into the realm of a governmental activ-
ity at some time in the future. The manifest injustice of allowing a state
to operate with impunity in the marketplace by subsequently invoking its
sovereign character was recognized over a century ago by Sir Robert Phil-
limore in The Charkieh.'53 It is important to distinguish between a claim
relating to a ship and a claim relating to cargo carried on a ship. State
immunity for purposes of adjudicating the merits in a proceeding con-
cerning a ship depends upon the governmental or non-governmental char-
acter of the ship at the time the cause of action arose. Execution of judg-
ment is treated as a separate aspect of state immunity which is dealt with
in subsequent articles of the ILC draft. For the time being, it is sufficient
to note that a court may be able to exercise jurisdiction over a claim re-
lating to a merchant ship and then be precluded from enforcing the judg-
ment against the ship which has subsequently been requisitioned for mili-
tary service. This anomaly is due to the possibility of transforming the
character of a ship and the strong state interest in avoiding foreign state
jurisdiction over one of its warships and exemplifies one of the reasons for
granting state immunity. However, the judgment may be enforced against
a bond obtained for the release of a merchant ship now used for military
purposes.
In contrast, the question of state immunity for a claim relating to
cargo depends upon whether the claim relates to governmental or nongov-
ernmental activity. For example, a state is not entitled to immunity in a
proceeding relating to a commercial contract for the purchase, sale or car-
riage of cargo. The reference to the intended use of the cargo is inconsis-
tent with the objective criterion of the restrictive theory for determining
the commercial character of a contract or transaction. Also, the type of
ship on which the cargo is located may be relevant for purposes of enforc-
ing a judgment, but not for determining the governmental or non-govern-
mental nature of the claim relating to the cargo.
Article 18 refers to ships used by a state for "commercial [non-gov-
ernmental]" or "governmental non-commercial" service."" This distinc-
tion is discussed at length in the commentary:
The dichotomy of service of vessels classified according to a double
152. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19.
153. See The Charkieh, supra note 9.
154. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 18.
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criterion of "commercial and non-governmental" or "governmental
and non-commercial" use used by Professor Gilbert Gidel. The term
"governmental and non-commercial" is used in the 1926 Brussels
Convention, and the term "government non-commercial in conven-
tions of a universal character such as the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High seas and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea in which ships are classified according to their use, i.e., gov-
ernmental and non-commercial service as opposed to commercial ser-
vice. Some members of the Commission expressed misgivings concern-
ing this double criterion as it might suggest the possibility of a very
different combination of a double criterion, such as "governmental
commercial" service or "commercial and governmental" service. Other
members, on the other hand, denied the likelihood of this interpreta-
tion, and considered that "commercial" and "non-governmental"
could be taken cumulatively. Others again added that States, particu-
larly developing countries, and other public entities could engage in
activities of a commercial and governmental nature without submit-
ting to the jurisdiction of national courts. Furthermore, the purchase
of armaments was often concluded on a government-to-government
(G to G) basis, including the transport of such armaments by any type
of carrier, which would not normally be subject to the exercise of ju-
risdiction by any national court. The diversity of views led the Com-
mission to maintain square brackets around the phrase "non-
governmental. 55
With regard to the "governmental, non-commercial" character of the ship
or cargo, article 18 provides that: "[A] certificate signed by the diplomatic
representative or other competent authority of the State to which the
ship or cargo belongs and communicated to the court shall serve as evi-
dence of the character of that ship of cargo. "156
The double criterion of commercial non-governmental service raises
the possibility of commercial governmental service which would be enti-
tled to immunity. Under the restrictive theory of immunity, commercial
activity determined on the basis of its objective character is by definition
not governmental in nature. Commercial acts are acts which are regularly
performed by individuals in the marketplace or the private sector and do
not require the exercise of sovereign authority or involve the performance
of governmental functions. Any distinction between governmental and
non-governmental commercial activity could only be achieved by looking
beyond the objective nature of the conduct to the subjective purpose of
the state. As discussed above in connection with the commercial contract
exception, this objective element is totally inconsistent with the func-
tional approach of the restrictive theory and the practice of most
states.'5 7
Article 18 expressly excludes warships, naval auxiliaries or other
155. 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146.
156. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19.
157. Id.
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ships, as well as cargo belonging to a state carried on these ships, which
are used or intended for use in government non-commercial service. " As
the commentary explains, this provision is intended to include a wide va-
riety of ships:
Paragraph 2 enunciates the rule of State immunity in favour of war-
ships and naval auxiliaries, even though such vessels may be employed
occasionally for the carriage of cargoes for such purposes to cope with
an emergency or other natural calamities. Immunity is also main-
tained for other government ships such as police patrol boats, customs
inspection boats, oceanographic survey ships, training vessels and
dredgers, owned or operated by a State and used or intended for use
in government non-commercial service.1"
The European Convention does not address claims relating to ships
or cargo. The 1926 Brussels Convention on the Immunity of State-Owned
Vessels recognizes immunity for claims relating to ships owned or oper-
ated by a state and "used at the time a cause of action arises exclusively
on governmental and non-commercial service." (Emphasis added.) The
Brussels Convention recognizes immunity for claims relating to state-
owned cargoes carried on such ships or on merchant vessels for govern-
mental and non-commercial purposes."'
The laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United King-
dom deny immunity for claims relating to a ship owned, possessed, or
controlled by a state or in which it claims an interest if the ship was in or
intended for use for commercial purposes when the cause of action arose.
Similarly, a state is not immune from an action in rem against a cargo
carried on such a ship if the ship and the cargo were in use, or intended
for use, for commercial purposes when the claim arose. In personam ac-
tions relating to the cargo only require that the ship was in use or in-
tended for use for commercial purposes. The Canadian statute denies im-
munity for claims relating to a ship or cargo in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes either at the time the cause of action arose or the
proceedings were commenced. The Australian statute distinguishes be-
tween in rem actions against a ship or cargo by denying immunity if: 1)
the ship was in use for commercial purposes at the time the related cause
of action arose; or 2) the cargo was a commercial cargo at the time the
cause of action arose. The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, and the
United Kingdom also deny immunity under the concept of in rem sister
ship jurisdiction if both ships were used for commercial purposes at the
time the cause of action arose. 6 '
158. Id. at 19-20.
159. 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146, at 155.
160. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Im-
munity of State-owned Vessels, Brussels April 10, 1926, art. 3, CLXXVI L.N.T.S. 200 [here-
inafter, Convention for Unification].
161. 196 AusTL. AcTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19.
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Section 1605(b) of the FSIA recognizes an exception to state immu-
nity for admiralty suits brought to enforce a maritime lien based upon
the commercial shipping of a foreign state against a vessel or cargo of that
state.162 The plaintiff must comply with specific notice requirements
which prohibit the arrest of a state-owned vessel or cargo. The maritime
lien is then treated as an in personam claim against the foreign state
which owned the vessel or cargo at the time. The party loses the right to
bring an in rem or an in personam claim to enforce the maritime lien if
the vessel or cargo is arrested, unless the party was not aware of the state
interest. The judgment awarded in such a case cannot exceed the value of
the vessel or cargo at the time notice is served.
As explained in the commentary, this provision is designed to allow a
plaintiff to bring an in personam action against a foreign state to enforce
a maritime lien without having to arrest the ship or cargo:
The purpose of this subsection is to permit a plaintiff to bring suit in
a United States district court arising out of a maritime lien involving
a vessel or cargo of a foreign sovereign without arresting the vessel, by
instituting an in personam action against the foreign state in a man-
ner analogous to bringing such a suit against the United States ....
[It] is designed to avoid arrests of vessels or cargo of a foreign state to
commence a suit .... If, however, the vessel or its cargo is arrested or
attached, the plaintiff will lose his in personam remedy and the for-
eign state will be entitled to immunity-except in the rare case where
the plaintiff was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state
was involved. This would be a rare case because the flag of the vessel,
the circumstances giving rise to the maritime lien, or the information
contained in ship registries kept in ports throughout the United
States should make known the ownership of the vessel in question, if
not the cargo. If, however, the vessel or cargo is mistakenly arrested,
such arrest or attachment must, under Section 1609, be immediately
dissolved when the foreign state brings to the court's attention its in-
terest in the vessel or cargo and, hence, its right to immunity from
arrest. ' 3
As a result of the problems that have arisen in applying this provi-
sion of the FSIA, the American Bar Association has recommended, and
Congress adopted, two important changes in section 1605(b). First, the
FSIA provide an excessive penalty for improper arrest of a state-owned
vessel or cargo. The injured party forfeits the entire claim. Second, many
procedural uncertainties result from the transformation of an admiralty
claim in rem into an in personam action. Thus, the ABA proposed
amendments to: 1) limit the penalty for improper arrest to the damages
incurred during the detention and 2) allow the aggrieved party to enforce
a maritime lien or a preferred mortgage, as defined in the Ship Mortgage
Act, pursuant to the principles of law and rules of practice of suits in
162. See FSIA 28 U.S.C. sec. 1604(a)(2).
163. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 42.
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rem. The 100th Congress enacted the proposed amendments in an effort
to resolve the procedural problems that have arisen in admiralty cases
under the FSIA.' 6'
The immunity exception for claims relating to commercial shipping
recognized in the ILC draft is consistent with the restrictive theory and
state practice. However, the references to "intended use" and "commer-
cial non-governmental service" are inconsistent with the Brussels Con-
vention, the laws of Australian and the United States, and the functional
approach of the restrictive theory.' 65 Also, the question of immunity for a
claim relating to cargo is not dependent upon the character of the ship on
which the cargo is carried, as indicated in the ILC draft. In this regard, it
would be useful for the Commission to consider the Australian statute
which distinguishes between claims relating to vessels and cargoes. This
important provision deserves close attention during the second reading of
the draft.
I. Article 19: Effect of an Arbitration Agreement
The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for a claim aris-
ing out of a written arbitration agreement with regard to "a [commercial
contract] [civil or commercial matter]." Under article 19, a state cannot
invoke immunity in a proceeding which relates to the validity or interpre-
tation of the agreement, the arbitration proceeding, or the setting aside of
the award, unless the agreement provides otherwise.'66 The enforcement
of a judgment or an arbitration award is covered by Part IV of the ILC
draft concerning the immunity of state property. As explained in the
commentary:
The article is based upon the concept of implied consent to the super-
visory jurisdiction of a court of another State which is otherwise com-
petent to determine questions connected with the arbitration agree-
ment, such as the validity of the obligation to arbitrate or to go to
arbitration or to compel the settlement of a difference by arbitration,
the interpretation and validity of the arbitration clause or agreement,
the arbitration procedure and the setting aside of arbitral awards.6 7
The state immunity exception in article 19 is expressly limited to written
arbitration agreements between a state and a private individual or corpo-
ration from another state. The exception does not apply to or in any way
affect the competence of the local courts with regard to arbitration agree-
ments between states or a state and an international organization.
Two important changes were made in the language originally pro-
posed by the Special Rapporteur. First, the title to article 19 was changed
from "Arbitration" to "Effect of an Arbitration Agreement" to reflect the
164. See Feldman, supra, note 12.
165. Convention for Unification, supra note 160.
166. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 20.
167. 1985 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146.
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implied consent aspect of the absolute theory of immunity."' 8 Second,
some states suggested that the exception, which originally covered arbi-
tration of differences relating to a civil or commercial matter, should be
limited to arbitration relating to a commercial contract. 69 The alternative
views concerning the scope of the exception are reflected in the bracketed
language in article 19. A state which agrees to arbitrate a dispute with a
private party cannot reasonably expect to avoid this obligation or the su-
pervision of a local court which has jurisdiction over the arbitration
agreement by invoking state immunity.' Private parties often enter into
arbitration agreements and participate in arbitration proceedings. Indeed
arbitration has become a common method of settling disputes which arise
in international commerce because of the advantages of using neutral ar-
bitrators rather than resorting to the local courts. The private individual
or corporation relies on this dispute settlement provision when entering
into the agreement with the foreign state. A state which enters into an
arbitration agreement with a private party is engaging in a non-govern-
mental activity which is not within the exclusive realm of a sovereign en-
tity. Thus under the restrictive theory, a state is not entitled to immunity
in a proceeding which concerns an arbitration agreement.
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom recognize a state immu-
nity exception for any proceedings relating to arbitration pursuant to a
written agreement, unless the arbitration agreement is between states or
provides otherwise. The European Convention and the Australian statute
expressly provide for the absence of immunity for proceedings relating to:
the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration
procedure, or the setting aside of the award.
1 7 '
The Canadian law does not provide a separate immunity exception
for proceedings relating to arbitration which would be covered by the
broad commercial activity or the implied waiver provision."7 Similarly,
the FSIA, as originally enacted, did not specifically address the question
of immunity in cases relating to arbitration agreements. In such cases, the
United States courts denied immunity on the basis of implied waiver."'
The American Bar Association recommended that the FSIA be amended:
"to clarify that an agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of immu-
nity in an action to enforce that agreement or to enforce the resultant
award... . '" The 100th Congress amended the FSIA to provide a sepa-
rate exception for an action:
168. Id. at 157.
169. Id. at 158.
170. Id. at 158. (The I.L.C. commentary notes that states differ in the degree to which
the local courts may exercise judicial control or supervision over arbitration.)
171. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 45; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 19.
172. III Can. Stat. 45, supra note 19; FSIA U.S.C. § 1604(a)(2).
173. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 18, at 4.
174. Id. at 2.
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[birought either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign State
with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties
with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration
under the laws of the United an award made pursuant to such an
agreement to arbitrate. 7' [Please note minor drafting changes in the
above text as approved by Congress.]
This provision applies only if: 1) the arbitration takes place, or is in-
tended to take place, in the United States; 2) the agreement or award is
governed by an international agreement in force for the United States
concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; 3) the for-
eign state would not be entitled to immunity for the underlying claim
under the FSIA; or 4) the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication. The statute as amended also precludes the
application of the act of state doctrine in cases involving arbitral agree-
ments and provides for enforcement of a judgment based on an order
confirming an arbitral award against the property in the United States of
a foreign state used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based.17
Article 19 is consistent with the clear trend in state practice to deny
immunity for claims relating to arbitration agreements. However, the ar-
bitration exception to state immunity is distinct from the implied consent
and the commercial activity exceptions. The ILC draft should not at-
tempt to reduce the principle of state immunity to a pervasive rule of
immunity subject only to exceptions which can be traced to implied con-
sent or a commercial contract. This narrow interpretation would be in-
consistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory and the
clear trend in state practice. The ILC should adopt a broad arbitration
exception to state immunity in article 19, excluding the bracketed refer-
ence to commercial contracts.
J. Article 20: Nationalization
The ILC draft does not prejudge "any question that may arise in
regard to extraterritorial effects of measures of nationalization taken by a
State with regard to property, movable or immovable, industrial or intel-
lectual." '177 The commentary describes this provision contained in article
20 as a general reservation concerning nationalization measures which are
understood to involve the exercise of sovereign authority. 7 ' This lan-
guage was added as a result of concerns expressed in connection with the.
175. See Feldman, supra note 12.
176. See Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State,
before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Govern-
mental Relations, May 28, 1987 [hereinafter, Testimony].
177. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 20.
178. Id. at 36.
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state immunity exception in article 15 for an infringement of intangible
property rights within the territory of the state seeking to exercise
jurisdiction." 9
State immunity provides a jurisdictional immunity in a proceeding
which impleads a foreign state with regard to conduct involving the exer-
cise of sovereign authority which would otherwise fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the local courts. This immunity, which prevents a court from ap-
plying the domestic law in a particular proceeding, does not in any way
affect the substantive law of a state which governs activities within its
territory, including the activities of a foreign state. 8 0 Furthermore, it
does not affect any liability which a state may incur under international
law.' The court merely refrains from adjudicating the merits of a claim
or enforcing a judgment. Thus state immunity does not affect the na-
tional or international legal norms which determine the extraterritorial
effect of expropriation measures or any other act of a state in the exercise
of its sovereign authority. The question of state immunity for proceedings
relating to nationalization is not addressed in the European Convention
or any of the state immunity statutes except for the United States stat-
ute. The FSIA provides a state immunity exception for a proceeding in-
volving rights in property taken in violation of international law due to
the arbitrary or discriminatory nature of the taking or the failure to pro-
vide compensation when required by international law. 8 2 Under section
1605(a)(3), a U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction over a claim relating to
such property if the actual property, or any property exchanged for it, is
present in the United States in connection with commercial activity. 8 3 As
explained in the commentary, the provision includes two standards de-
pending upon whether the property is held by a foreign state or a state
entity:
The first category involves cases where the property in question or
any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States, and where such presence is in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state, or politi-
cal subdivision,agency or instrumentality of the foreign state. The sec-
ond category is where the property, or any property exchanged for
such property, is (i) owned or operated by an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state and (ii) that agency or instrumentality is engaged
in a commercial activity in the United States. Under the second cate-
gory, the property need not be present in connection with a commer-
179. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 106.
180. See Sucharitkul, supra note 7.
181. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326 (3d ed. 1979).
182. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1). ("The term 'taken in violation of international law'
would include the nationalization of expropriation of property without payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation required by international law. It would also include
takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in nature." H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19-20, (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6618.)
183. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
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cial activity of the agency or instrumentality. 8'
Some U.S. courts have continued to refrain from exercising jurisdic-
tion in expropriation cases by applying the act of state doctrine which is
a domestic legal principle."8 5 This doctrine is one of judicial restraint
under which a court refuses to judge the acts of a foreign state within its
own territory due to the sensitive political issues involved. The doctrine
recognizes the possibility of interference with the executive branch, which
is primarily responsible for foreign relations.'8 6 Whereas state immunity
generally arises with regard to the activities or property of a foreign state
within the territory of the state asserting its jurisdiction, the act of state
doctrine is a defense often invoked by a private party in a lawsuit to pre-
vent the court from judging the act of a foreign state within its own terri-
tory. It is a defense relating to the merits of the case which applies even if
the foreign state is not a party to the proceeding.
The American Bar Association has recommended amending the FSIA
to expressly provide that the act of state doctrine does not prevent the
exercise of jurisdiction over cases involving property taken in violation of
international law. 187 As Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opin-
ion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba:
I do not agree, however, that balancing the functions of the judiciary
and those of the political branches compels the judiciary to eschew
acting in all cases in which the under-lying issue is the validity of ex-
propriation under customary international law. Such a result would be
an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to persons who seek to
resolve their grievances by the judicial process.... Until international
tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of various coun-
tries afford the best means for the development of a respected body of
international law. There is less hope for progress in this long-ne-
glected area if the resolution of all disputes involving an "act of state"
is relegated to political rather than judicial process.' "
The proposed amendment to the FSIA would make it easier for persons
whose property has been taken unlawfully by a foreign state to obtain
judicial redress. The State Department has expressed reservations about
this proposal. "
The ILC draft does not contain an express exception for expropria-
tion cases. It is important that the United States preserves its position
under the FSIA which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over expro-
priation claims. The position of Congress is clear on this issue. Article 20
184. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 42.
185. Id. at 4.
186. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972) (citing
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897).
187. A.B.A. SEc. INT'L L. PRAC. REP., August 1984.
188. 406 U.S. 759, 774-75 (1972).
189. See Testimony, supra, note 176.
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could be amended to provide that the ILC draft does not prejudge "any
question that may arise in relation to measures of nationalization."
VIII. STATE IMMUNITY IN RESPECT OF PROPERTY FROM MEASURES OF
CONSTRAINT
The principle of state immunity consists of two distinct elements
concerning: 1) the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of a claim in
which a foreign state has been impleaded; and 2) the jurisdiction to exer-
cise control over the property of a foreign state. 9 ' With regard to adjudi-
cative jurisdiction, a foreign state can invoke immunity if the proceeding
relates to a sovereign or governmental activity. As discussed earlier, a
state is not required to justify or explain its governmental acts and can-
not be held accountable for such acts in the court of another state be-
cause of the sovereign equality, independence and dignity of all states.'
Similarly, property which is owned, possessed, or controlled by a state
and used in connection with governmental activities is not subject to the
judicial jurisdiction of another state, even if the property is located in the
forum state. 1'2 As discussed in the commentary:
If it is admitted that "no sovereign State can exercise its sovereign
power over another equally sovereign state (par in parem imperium
non habet), it follows a fortiori that no measures of constraint by way
of execution or coercion can be exercised by the authority of one State
against another State and its property. Such possibility does not exist
even in international litigation, whether by judicial settlement or
arbitration.' 93
The immunity extended to state property is important from a practi-
cal point of view, in addition to considerations of sovereign attributes and
foreign relations. The assertion of control by a state over the property of
a foreign state which is used in connection with governmental activities
would interfere with the foreign state's ability to carry out its governmen-
tal functions. For example, attaching an embassy bank account or repos-
sessing all of the typewriters used by a consular mission would clearly
interfere with the ability of the state to carry out its diplomatic or consu-
lar functions. A state may choose to ignore the assertion of adjudicative
jurisdiction by refusing to participate in a proceeding and still enjoy pro-
tection from the enforcement of a judgment against its property. How-
ever, a state cannot simply ignore the assertion of judicial control over
state property which interferes with its present use.
Thus the principle of state immunity requires a two-pronged ap-
proach. First, it requires a state immunity exception for a court to decide
the merits of a claim against a foreign state. Second, it requires a separate
190. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 38.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 38.
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exception for the exercise of judicial control over the property of a foreign
state at any stage of the proceeding. There may be situations in which a
foreign state is not entitled to invoke immunity, a judgment is entered
against that state, and yet the judgment is not enforceable because the
foreign state property within the forum is still entitled to immunity.
A. Article 21: State Immunity From Measures of Constraint
Under article 21, a state is immune from measures of constraint on
the use of property owned, possessed or controlled by the state [or in
which it has a legally protected interest], unless the property is specifi-
cally in use, or intended for use, for commercial [non-governmental] pur-
poses and is related to the claim or the state entity against which the
proceeding is instituted."" Article 21 also provides an exception for prop-
erty which "has been allocated or earmarked by the state for the satisfac-
tion of the claim which is the object of that proceeding. 1' 95 As discussed
in the commentary, this article is designed to accommodate the various
measures of constraint which are available in different legal systems, in-
cluding attachment, arrest and execution. 9 "
The immunity from measures of constraint on the use of state prop-
erty is extended to property which is owned, possessed or controlled by a
state, "[or in which it has a legally protected interest]. '1 7 The controver-
sial phrase which appears in brackets is explained in the commentary as
follows:
The interest of the State may be so marginal as to be unaffected by
any measure of constraint, or by nature the interest of the State,
whether an equity of redemption or reversionary interest, may remain
intact irrespective of the measure of constraint placed upon the use of
the property. Thus, an easement or servitude in favour of a State
could continue to subsist and remain exercisable by the State, despite
transfer of ownership or a change of hands in the possession or control
of the property. Some members thought that there was room for
maintaining this phrase while others thought that to do so would un-
duly widen the scope of State immunity from execution. The Commis-
sion awaits reactions from governments on this point to which it will
return on second reading. "0
The restrictive theory of state immunity provides a limited, func-
tional immunity for property which is owned, possessed or controlled by a
state as a sovereign entity. The purpose of the immunity is to prevent the
exercise of judicial control over the property of a foreign state which
would interfere with its governmental functions. Sir Ian Sinclair dis-
cussed the functional nature of the immunity accorded to state property
194. Id. at 20.
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id. at 37, 39.
197. Id. at 20.
198. Id. at 39.
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in his lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law:
It will be seen that in recent years, there has been a marked trend in
the direction of limiting or qualifying the rule of absolute immunity
from execution, particularly in those jurisdictions which apply the re-
strictive doctrine of jurisdictional immunity. Nonetheless, the pre-
dominant tendency in comparative case-law is to acknowledge that
there is a clear distinction between jurisdictional immunity and im-
munity from execution, so that it does not follow automatically from
the fact that a court may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction in respect
of the non-sovereign activities of a foreign State that it or any other
court can authorise measures of execution against any property of the
foreign State situate in the territory of the State of the forum. One
has to look at the nature of the property against which measures of
execution are sought to be levied. If that property is devoted to the
sovereign or public purposes of the foreign State, execution cannot be
levied, notwithstanding that the original claim may have been based
on the jure gestionis activities of the State.' 99
Measures of constraint imposed by the forum state on property other
than that which is owned, possessed or controlled by a foreign state
would not interfere with its ability to perform governmental functions.
The immunity is intended to provide protection for property which is ac-
tually being used in connection with a governmental activity. For pur-
poses of state immunity, this would include property in which the state
has a direct and present interest, such as ownership, possession or con-
trol. Property in which the state has an indirect, conditional or future
interest is not property that is currently used or required for governmen-
tal functions.
The two exceptions to the immunity of state property contained in
article 21 are discussed in the commentary:
The principle of immunity is subject to two conditions which, if either
is met, would result in non-immunity: (a) property specifically in use
or intended for use by the State for commercial [non-governmental]
purposes, or (b) property allocated or earmarked by the State for the
satisfaction of a claim. In subparagraph (a), the property must have a
connection with the object of the claim, or with the agency or instru-
mentality against which the proceeding was directed. 200
The earmarked property exception is explained in the commentary:
In subparagraph (b) the property can be subject to measures of con-
straint only if it has been allocated or earmarked for the satisfaction
of the claim or debt which is the object of the proceeding. This should
have the effect of preventing extraneous or unprotected claimants
from frustrating the intention of the State to satisfy specific claims or
to make payment for an admitted liability. Understandably the ques-
tion of whether a particular property has or has not been allocated for
199. See Sinclair, supra note 7, at 242.
200. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 40.
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satisfaction of a claim may remain in some situations ambiguous and
should be resolved by the court."'
This provision may interfere with domestic law and public policy to
the extent that the forum provides special protection or preferences for
certain creditors or claimants. It may also be unfair to allow a state to
earmark property for a particular claimant or creditor to the detriment of
other similarly injured claimants or creditors who had entered into trans-
actions with the state without notice of the earmarked property. Cases
involving a secured creditor or an express waiver of immunity with regard
to specific property in a particular case would fall within the state immu-
nity exception for consent. That is the subject of ILC article 22. There is
no counterpart to the earmarked property exception in the European
Convention or in the state immunity statutes.
The commercial property exception is consistent with the functional
approach of the restrictive theory, with the exception of the subjective
"purpose" element for determining the commercial character of the prop-
erty and the double criterion in the phrase "commercial [non-governmen-
tal] purposes." The serious problems raised by the subjective test and the
double criterion are discussed in connection with the definition of a com-
mercial contract in article 3 and the commercial shipping exception in
article 18 respectively.20 2 The concerns raised in connection with the im-
munity from adjudicative jurisdiction also apply to the immunity ex-
tended to state property.
The commentary discusses the time at which the character of state
property should be determined for purposes of immunity:
The use of the word "is" in subparagraph (a) indicates that the prop-
erty should be specifically in use or intended for use by the State for
commercial [non-governmental] purposes at the time the proceeding
for attachment or execution is instituted. To fix an early time could
unduly fetter the State's freedom to dispose of its property. It is the
understanding of the Commission that States would not encourage or
permit abuses of this provision, for example, by changing the status of
their property in order to void attachment or execution.0 2
Determining the character of the property at the time the proceeding
is instituted would allow a state to transfer the commercial property
which is the subject of the dispute to non-commercial use or from one
state agency to another to avoid jurisdiction over the property. Once the
property is protected from jurisdiction, the private party would be left
with an unenforceable judgment because the commercial property excep-
tion in article 21 requires a nexus between the property and either the
claim or the state agency or instrumentality involved in the lawsuit. As a
matter of public policy, a court should not give effect to a foreign state's
201. Id.
202. Id. at 19, 20 & 70.
203. Id. at 40.
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attempt to circumvent the administration of justice by shielding commer-
cial property. The ILC draft does not address this problem.
The underlying principles which justify state immunity do not pro-
vide any reason for limiting the enforcement of a judgment to property
which is related to the claim. Indeed certain claims, such as those involv-
ing personal injury or property damage, may arise independently of any
particular property or in connection with property which is destroyed as a
result of the state conduct responsible for the injury. The issue under the
functional approach of restrictive immunity is whether or not the prop-
erty is being used in connection with a governmental activity. A plaintiff
who has obtained a judgment against a foreign state should be able to
enforce it against any state property which is subject to jurisdiction and
which is not entitled to immunity.
The European Convention contains an optional provision which de-
nies immunity from execution to property used exclusively in connection
with commercial activity. The state immunity statutes of Canada, Paki-
stan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom deny immunity
for property in use, or intended for use, for commercial purposes at the
time of enforcement. Australian law allows a judgment to be enforced
against property substantially in use for commercial purposes. The Euro-
pean Convention and most state immunity statutes provide that the
property of a state entity which exercises sovereign authority is entitled
to immunity only if the property of a state would be entitled to immunity
under the circumstances. Canadian law denies immunity to property of a
state agency which is not entitled to immunity in the initial proceeding
on the merits. Property of separate state entities is not included in the
immunity recognized in the Australian statute." 4
The FSIA recognizes a general principle of immunity for state prop-
erty from attachment, arrest and execution in section 1609, and it recog-
nizes various exceptions in sections 1610 and 1611.205 State property may
be subject to prejudgment attachment if two conditions are met: 1) the
state has expressly waived its immunity for this type of attachment; and
2) the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment and not to ob-
tain jurisdiction. As explained in the FSIA commentary:
Attachments for jurisdictional purposes have been criticized as involv-
ing United States courts in litigation not involving any significant U.S.
interest or jurisdictional contacts, apart from the fortuitous presence
of property in the jurisdiction. Such cases frequently require the ap-
plication of foreign law to events which occur entirely abroad. Such
attachments can also give rise to serious friction in the United States
foreign relations. In some cases, plaintiffs obtain numerous attach-
ments over a variety of foreign government assets found in various
parts of the United States. This shotgun approach has caused signifi-
204. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdiction Immunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20, at 26-27.
205. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
VOL. 17:2
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES
cant irritation to many foreign governments. At the same time, one of
the fundamental purposes of this bill is to provide a long-arm statute
that makes attachment for jurisdictional purposes unnecessary in
cases where there is a nexus between the claim and the United
States." 6
The commercial property exception in section 1610(a)(2) provides
that state property used for a commercial activity in the United States is
not immune from proceedings to obtain satisfaction of a judgment if "the
property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim
is based."20 7 In contrast with the ILC provision, the FSIA exception is
phrased in terms of property which "is or was used" for a commercial
activity. The FSIA commentary discusses the difficulties which may arise
in determining the character and ownership of state property:
The language "is or was used" in paragraph (2) contemplates a situa-
tion where property may be transferred from the commercial activity
which is the subject of the suit in an effort to avoid the process of the
court. This language, however, does not bear on the question of
whether particular property is to be deemed property of the entity
against which the judgment was obtained. The courts will have to de-
termine whether property in the custody of an agency or instrumen-
tality is property of the agency or instrumentality, whether property
held by one agency should be deemed to be property of another,
whether property held by an agency is property of the foreign state.0 8
As discussed with regard to ILC article 21, the nexus required be-
tween the claim and the property is inconsistent with the functional ap-
proach of the restrictive theory and the two distinct aspects of state im-
munity concerning jurisdiction and enforcement. The ABA has
recommended that the FSIA be amended to "provide for execution of
judgment against any property of a foreign state which is used or in-
tended to be used for a commercial activity in the United States.""20
The State Department opposes removing the nexus requirement in
section 1610(a) and argues that the requirement is not a significant prob-
lem in cases involving commercial activity for the following reasons:
Most states value their commercial reputation and honor commercial
debt; much state commercial activity is carried out by state agencies
and instrumentalities the property of which is all, under current law,
subject to execution to satisfy any judgment against the entity; these
basic matters of dispute settlement and security are regulated by con-
tract in commercial or financial dealings; and arbitration is increas-
ingly used to settle disputes between private business and foreign
sovereigns. °0
206. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 27.
207. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (a)(2).
208. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 30.
209. See Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 19.
210. See Testimony, supra note 176.
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The executive branch is concerned about the use of unrelated com-
mercial property to satisfy judgments in politically sensitive tort cases,
such as The Letelier2 " case involving the assassination of a former Chil-
ean diplomat." 2 A court may refrain from exercising jurisdiction in a case
involving particularly sensitive foreign relations issues which are properly
left to the executive branch under the political question doctrine.21 As-
sassination is not the type of activity which is likely to be the subject of a
claim of state immunity during the adjudicative phase of a proceeding. A
state would not want to argue that assassination is a legitimate govern-
mental function. In the enforcement phase of a proceeding, the question
of the immunity of state property is determined by the governmental or
non-governmental use of the property and not by the substance of the
claim.
Under section 1610(b), the property of a foreign state agency or in-
strumentality engaged in commercial activity in the United States is not
entitled to immunity if the entity has explicitly or implicitly waived this
immunity, or if the claim falls within the state immunity exceptions in
section 1605 for commercial activity, unlawful expropriation, injury to
person or property, or admiralty claims, regardless of whether the prop-
erty is related to the claim. As explained in the commentary, this excep-
tion would apply to governmental or non-governmental property:
Section 1610(b) provides for execution against the property of agen-
cies or instrumentalities of a foreign state in circumstances additional
to those provided in §1610(a). However, the agency or instrumentality
must be engaged in commercial activity in the United States. If so,
the plaintiff may obtain an attachment in aid of execution or execu-
tion against any property, commercial or noncommercial, of the
agency or instrumentality, but only in the circumstances set forth in
paragraphs (1) and (2).214
There are really two separate issues which arise in cases involving
state entities. The first is whether the entity authorized to perform gov-
ernmental activities is entitled to invoke immunity. A purely commercial
enterprise cannot claim immunity with regard to any of its property be-
cause it would not be authorized to perform governmental functions. The
second, assuming the entity is authorized to perform governmental func-
tions, is whether the property in question is used in connection with those
functions. A state entity which is authorized to engage in governmental
activities would be entitled to claim immunity for property used in con-
nection with those activities under the restrictive theory of immunity. Ex-
ercising jurisdiction over property used for governmental functions by a
state entity in the absence of consent, as suggested in the FSIA commen-
tary, would be inconsistent with the principle of state immunity regard-
211. de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F.Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
212. Id.
213. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
214. See 1986 Int'l L.Comm'n, supra note 21, at 32.
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less of the nature of the underlying claim. However, state immunity
would not extend to unlawfully expropriated property because the state
would not have a valid claim of ownership, possession, or use.
In general, the separate immunity for state property and the com-
mercial property exception contained in the ILC draft are consistent with
restrictive immunity and state practice. However, article 21 should be
amended to exclude: 1) the nexus requirement, "[a legally protected in-
terest]"; and 2) "commercial [non-governmental] purposes."
B. Article 22: Consent to Measures of Constraint
Article 22 recognizes an exception to the immunity for state property
if the state has expressly consented to such measures by international
agreement, written contract, or by a declaration before the court in a par-
ticular case.2" As the commentary explains, the "express consent can be
given generally with regard to measures of constraint or property, or
given for particular measures or particular property or, indeed given for
both measures and property." '
A state which consents to jurisdiction to decide the merits of a claim
has not consented to jurisdiction over state property for attachment or
execution. A separate express consent is required for measures of con-
straint against state property. As discussed in the ILC commentary, con-
sent given in an international agreement or a written contract can be
withdrawn only in accordance with its terms, usually before a proceeding
is instituted.
The European Convention and the state immunity statutes recognize
an exception to the immunity of state property based on express written
consent. The European Convention requires express consent for a partic-
ular case. The laws of Australia, Canada, and the United States refer to
an express waiver which can only be withdrawn in accordance with its
terms. The Canadian and U.S. statutes recognize an express or implied
waiver.2 1 The FSIA commentary provides examples of an express or im-
plied waiver: "A foreign state may have waived its immunity from execu-
tion inter alia by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, an official state-
ment, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings
relating to judgment or to execution.
'21 8
ILC article 22 requires a separate and express consent to jurisdiction
over state property. This requirement is consistent with the distinct na-
ture of the immunity accorded to state property and the importance of
this immunity which is generally relevant for purposes of the second
phase of a proceeding concerning the enforcement of a judgment. The
215. Id. at 21.
216. Id. at 41.
217. See 196 AusTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties, supra note 19.
218. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 30.
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exception contained in article 22, excluding the reference to other prop-
erty in which the state has a legally protected interest, is consistent with
the restrictive theory of state immunity and existing state practice.
C. Article 23: Specific Categories of Property
Article 23 excludes from attachment or execution the following types
of property: property including a bank account which is used or intended
for use in connection with a diplomatic or consular mission; military
property used or intended for use for military purposes; property of a
central bank or other monetary authority; and property which is part of a
state's cultural heritage or archives or forms part of a scientific or histori-
cal exhibition. The property listed above is subject to measures of con-
straint only if the state has specifically consented or has earmarked the
property to satisfy a claim.219 The state property accorded immunity in
ILC article 23 is usually associated with governmental functions. This
provision is consistent with the restrictive theory and existing state prac-
tice. The European Convention provides broad immunity for state prop-
erty subject only to express written consent in a particular case. Most of
the state immunity statutes expressly preserve the immunity of diplo-
matic, military or central bank property. The other types of property not
expressly mentioned in the statutes, such as state archives or cultural
heritage property, would enjoy the immunity extended to state property
and would not be subject to the commercial property or express consent
exceptions.22
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. Article 24: Service of Process
Under article 24, a proceeding against a foreign state can only be in-
stituted in following ways: 1) by service of process in accordance with a
special arrangement between the claimant and the state; 2) in accordance
with an applicable international convention which is binding on the fo-
rum state and the foreign state; 3) by transmission through diplomatic
channels to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; or, 4) by registered mail or by
other means permitted by the laws of both the forum state and the for-
eign state. Service of process through diplomatic channels or registered
mail is effective when received. The documents must be accompanied by
a translation into the official language of the foreign state, if necessary. A
state which enters an appearance on the merits can not assert inadequate
service of process.221
The European Convention recognizes diplomatic channels as the ac-
ceptable method for transmitting documents. The state immunity stat-
219. Id. at 22.
220. See 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra
note 19.
221. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 22.
VOL. 17:2
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES
utes provide for service of process through diplomatic channels or in any
manner in which the state has agreed; for example, in an international
agreement between the states concerned or an agreement with the claim-
ant. The European Convention and the national laws provide that a state
which appears in a proceeding waives any objection to the method of ser-
vice. The FSIA provides for service by registered mail.2"
The ILC draft provides a hierarchy of acceptable methods for trans-
mitting documents to a foreign state. Article 24 gives preference to the
methods recognized in the European Convention and in the national laws.
As alternatives, it also authorizes service by registered mail or by other
means permitted by the laws of the states concerned.
B. Article 25: Default Judgment
A default judgment can not be rendered against a foreign state unless
the claimant has complied with the requirements for service of process in
article 23, and not less than three months have passed since the service
was affected. A copy of the judgment, and a translation if necessary, must
be sent to the state by the means provided for service. The foreign state
must be given at least three months from the time notice is received to
have the judgment set aside.22 3
The European Convention and the state immunity laws contain simi-
lar provisions concerning default judgments. The claimant must properly
transmit notice of the proceeding and the judgment. The foreign state
must have sufficient time to enter an appearance on the merits and then
to have the judgment set aside. The Australian law requires a court to
determine that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity before granting
a motion for a default judgment. The U.S. statute requires a claimant to
establish "his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court" before a default judgment is entered against a foreign state.2 " As
explained in the FSIA commentary, this is the same requirement for de-
fault judgments against the United States Government.2 25 The commen-
tary also provides that: "In determining whether the claimant has estab-
lished his claim or right to relief, it is expected that courts will take into
account the extent to which the plaintiffs case depends on appropriate
discovery against the foreign state.
'2 2 6
It is important that a court be satisfied as to the basis for the claim
against a foreign state before entering a default judgment to avoid frivo-
lous or unfounded judgments. However, the burden of the party to pro-
vide some evidence of the claim should not extend to materials within the
222. See 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties, supra note 19.
223. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 23.
224. 196 AUSTL. AcTs. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19.
225. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 25.
226. Id. at 26.
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exclusive control of the foreign state. This issue is not addressed in ILC
article 25 or the commentary.
C. Article 26: Immunity from Measures of Coercion
The ILC draft recognizes the immunity of a state from measures re-
quiring it either to perform or to refrain from performing a specific act
lest it incur a financial penalty. The immunity from measures of coercion
in connection with a judicial proceeding refers to preliminary measures
rather than the final judgment.227
The European Convention prohibits any measure of coercion against
a foreign state. The laws of Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa,
and the United Kingdom prohibit any relief against a foreign state in the
form of an injunction or in the form of an order for specific performance,
unless the state has expressly consented. In contrast, Australian law pro-
vides for any order for interim or final relief not inconsistent with a for-
eign state's immunity under the statute, except for an order requiring a
foreign state to employ or to reinstate a person in employment. However,
the Australian statute does not allow a penalty by way of fine or impris-
onment for failure to comply with an order made against a foreign
state.22s
There is no counterpart to this provision in the FSIA. The general
statement of immunity from jurisdiction contained in section 1604 would
include the exercise of jurisdiction by a court at any stage in the proceed-
ing, including a pretrial restraining order or an injunction. However, the
FSIA incorporates the restrictive theory of immunity and would presuma-
bly limit immunity from pretrial relief to proceedings relating to govern-
mental activities. For example, there is no reason to deny injunctive relief
against a foreign state in a proceeding relating to commercial activity.
Nonetheless, foreign relations considerations would encourage restraint at
this initial stage in a proceeding.
The complete prohibition against preliminary coercive measures con-
tained in ILC article 26 is consistent with the European Convention and
most of the state immunity statutes. However, it is clearly inconsistent
with the Australian law, probably inconsistent with the FSIA, and ex-
ceeds the immunity required by the functional approach of the restrictive
theory.
D. Article 27: Procedural Immunities
The ILC draft recognizes certain procedural immunities for a foreign
state. Under article 27, a state cannot be required to produce documents
or disclose information with the failure to do so resulting in a fine or
227. Id. at 23.
228. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20.
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penalty. Also, a state cannot be required to provide a bond or deposit to
guarantee the payment of the costs involved in the proceeding."2 9 Some
members of the Commission expressed reservations about extending this
second aspect of procedural immunity to a plaintiff state which volunta-
rily avails itself of the courts of the forum state. 30 Article 27 is explained
in the commentary as follows:
Sometimes States, for reasons of security or their own domestic law,
may be prevented from submitting certain documents or disclosing
certain information to a court of another State. Therefore, States
should not be subject to penalties for protecting their national secur-
ity or for complying with their domestic law. At the same time, the
legitimate interests of the private litigant should not be overlooked...
• Courts are bound by their own domestic rules of procedure. In do-
mestic rules of procedure in many States, the refusal for any reason,
to submit evidence by a litigant, would allow or even require the judge
to draw certain inferences which may affect the merits of the case.
Such inferences by a judge under the domestic rules of procedure of
the State of the forum, when permitted are not considered a penalty.
The final sentence specifies that no fine or pecuniary penalty shall be
imposed.2 3'
With the exception of the FSIA, the European Convention and the
state immunity statutes recognize immunity from a fine or imprisonment
for the foreign state's failure or refusal to disclose information or to pro-
duce documents.23 2 The European Convention expressly allows a court to
draw any conclusion deemed appropriate from such failure or refusal.
The Australian law provides that this refusal to disclose information does
not, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss a complaint.233
Only the European Convention recognizes the immunity of a foreign
state from the requirement of posting a bond or deposit. Normally a for-
eign state that voluntarily initiates a proceeding in a court is presumed to
consent to the procedural requirements of the forum. These requirements
may include providing some type of deposit or bond to guarantee the
payment of costs associated with the proceeding.
The procedural immunities in the ILC draft are generally consistent
with state practice. However, distinguishing between foreign state plain-
tiffs and defendants for purposes of the requirement to provide a bond or
guarantee would be useful.
E. Article 28: Non-discrimination
The ILC articles must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis be-
229. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 24.
230. Id. at 50.
231. Id. at 49.
232. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); Jurisdictional Immunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20.
233. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 24.
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tween states party to the convention. Article 28 recognizes two exceptions
based upon the principle of reciprocity or on a special agreement between
the states concerned,"' as explained in the commentary:
After prolonged discussion, the Commission agreed to adopt article 28
based on the analogy to article 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations of 1961 and other Corresponding Conventions. A cer-
tain degree of flexibility was considered desirable for those marginal
instances where a restrictive application of the present articles might
be applied by the State of the forum in respect of another State, be-
cause that other State has adopted the same restrictive application of
the articles to the State of the forum. This reciprocal treatment re-
sulting in restrictive application of the articles is not to be taken as a
discriminatory measure against the other State adopting the same re-
strictive application.""
This reciprocity provision is consistent with the European Conven-
tion and with the state immunity laws of the various countries, except the
United States, which restricts immunity based upon reciprocity.236 The
United States has adopted a policy of "reverse reciprocity" whereby it
limits its assertions of immunity in foreign courts in accordance with the
rules applied to foreign states in United States courts. Nondiscrimination
and special agreements are not addressed in the convention or in the
statutes.
X. CONCLUSION
While there is disagreement about particular aspects of the law of
state immunity there appears to be a general agreement on the impor-
tance of this area of the law and on the value of adopting a convention on
jurisdictional immunities. Members States have expressed support in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly for the Commission's attempt
to codify this area of law. Mr. Al-Baharna of Bahrain stated that:
[The] question of jurisdictional immunities of States and their prop-
erty had gained practical significance with the increase in the com-
mercial activities of modern States, necessitating codification of the
subject. No other topic of international law had such profound impli-
cations for national law and procedures." 7
Prince Ajibola of Nigeria expressed the view that:
[The] complexity of the topic "Jurisdictional immunities of States
and their property" could not be underestimated in the light of in-
creasing economic development and interdependence, and varying
234. Id. at 51.
235. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45; Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20.
236. McDowell, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1976, at 323
(State Department 1977).
237. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (38th mtg.) 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.38 (1986).
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State practice among industrialized, socialist and developing countries
such as Nigeria, which engaged in State trading as a means of eco-
nomic survival .... The fact that a national court could decide on the
scope and application of the existing law on State immunity caused
friction in international relations. His delegation believed that the
work of the Commission on the topic of jurisdictional immunities was
of paramount importance, particularly to developing countries."2 8
Mr. Calero Rodrigues of Brazil indicated that:
The development of activities of States in fields outside the usual
framework had suggested that some adjustments in the application of
the traditional concept of absolute immunity would be appropriate.
On the other hand, some national legislations and court decisions had
gone too far in failing to recognize immunity and had seemed to dis-
miss lightly the basic principle of sovereign equality of States. In the
chaotic situation being created, the international community needed a
compendium of basic rules in order to re-establish some order in a
domain of the utmost importance. That could be done only by strik-
ing a careful balance between long-standing practices and emerging
needs. 3 9
There are inherent difficulties in the codification of the law of state
immunity. International practice in this area in terms of treaties and de-
cisions of international tribunals is relatively scarce. The principle of
state immunity has developed primarily in the national courts of states
which have addressed cases in which private parties have brought claims
against foreign states. Thus, the law of state immunity is closely related
to the domestic rules of procedure in the various countries. States have
acknowleged these difficulties in their comments before the Sixth Com-
mittee of the General Assembly.
Mr. Guillaume of France expressed the view that:
The topic was a difficult one for two reasons: first, international cus-
tomary law in that area was fairly limited, and existing conventions
had not been a resounding success; second, national law was diverse
and, as in his country, often the outcome of jurisprudence in courts
where views were susceptible to change. 40
Mr. Al Khasawneh of Jordan stated that:
The difficulties inherent in attempting to translate varying and some-
times divergent State practice into a single uniform international in-
strument could not be overstated.... That difficulty was compounded
by the fact that in the absence of decisions by international tribunals
and given the scarcity of diplomatic practice, such varying practices
had, of necessity, to provide the main part of the source material for
the codification and progressive development of the law of State
238. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (37th mtg.) 1 73, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.37 (1986).
239. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (28th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.28 (1986). o
240. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (41st mtg.) 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.41 (1986).
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immunity.' 4'
Another factor which complicates the codification of this area of law
is the close relationship between the concept of the state and the state
activities which are entitled to immunity. There are fundamental differ-
ences as to the proper role of the state in the western democracies, the
socialist states, and developing countries.
Mr. Guevorguian of the USSR expressed the view that:
A State's economic activities, including those carried out through
commercial contracts, were not less important to the State than other
forms of activity. The State engaged in economic activities, not as a
private individual, but as a sovereign entity. A State sector of the
economy existed in all countries. In socialist countries, it was the pre-
dominant sector; in many newly independent States, it was developing
more and more strongly. His delegation therefore objected to the at-
tempts made in the draft to single out and set aside so-called commer-
cial activities on the pretext that they were not State activities
proper.1
42
Mr. A1-Qaysi of Iraq stated that:
Conceptual differences centered principally on safeguards that would
duly accommodate the concerns and needs of the developing countries
and give reasonable protection to their sovereign right to pursue poli-
cies commensurate with their economic and social development objec-
tives. In international relations, every State was both a grantor and
beneficiary of jurisdictional immunities; the question that arose, then,
related to the balance to be struck in a given set of circumstances
involving a conflict of sovereignties. The acceptability and durability
of that balance depended on its responsiveness to the actual needs of
the vast majority of the members of the international community.' 4'
The future of the draft convention on state immunity depends upon
the Commission's ability to accommodate the divergent views of states
and to resolve differences over particular aspects of state immunity in
light of the discussion in the Sixth Committee and in the formal written
comments submitted by Member States.2 44 The preliminary report of the
newly appointed special rapporteur, Mr. Motoo Ogiso of Japan, contains
various proposals for resolving these differences when the Commission be-
gins its second and final reading of the draft articles. 4 5
While the new Special Rapporteur's preliminary report has yet to be
considered by the Commission, it is worth noting his proposals for impor-
241. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (33rd mtg.) 52, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.33 (1986).
242. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (31st mtg.) 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.31 (1986).
243. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (34th mtg.) 1 53, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41Sr.34 (1986).
244. The written comments submitted by 28 Member States and Switzerland are con-
tained in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/410 and Adds 1-5, to be published in Documents of the 40th
Session [1988] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Part 1).
245. Preliminary Report, supra note 24.
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tant aspects of the draft articles: 1) the relationship between the pro-
posed convention and general rules of international law; 2) the relation-
ship between the principle of state immunity and the cases in which a
state is not entitled to claim immunity; 3) limitations on the immunity of
state enterprises; 4) the basis for determining the commercial character of
a contract for the purpose of denying immunity; and 5) the controversial
concept of "commercial non-governmental" state activity.2 46
With regard to the relationship between a convention and the general
principles of international law, the Special Rapporteur recognizes that
states are clearly divided up on whether to retain the bracketed reference
in article 6 to the relevant rules of international law. Many Member
States have commented on this issue in the Sixth Committee.
Mr. McKenzie of Trinidad and Tobago expressed the view that:
[The] reference by the International Law Commission to a "grey
zone" attested to a number of legal theories in existence relating to
the exact nature and basis of State immunity. In the view of his dele-
gation, the final text of draft article 6 should contain a reference to
"the relevant rules of general international law," because it was
doubtful that universal agreement was possible on the exact dividing
line between immunity and non-immunity.2
47
Sir John Freeland of the United Kingdom stated that:
Since it considered that the draft articles should not seek to put an
end to future development of the law in that area, his delegation
favoured the retention of the words in square brackets at the end of
article 6.148
Prince Ajibola of Nigeria stated that:
The phrase in square brackets should be an integral part of that arti-
cle. Otherwise, the rule of immunity would not be subject to the fu-
ture development of international law. General international law in-
cluded customary rules of international law based on the practice of
States. The future development of State practice should be left un-
frozen and undeterred by the formulation of the draft articles.
4
9
In contrast, Mr. Abdel Khalik of Egypt stated that:
The main purpose of drafting a convention to codify the jurisdictional
immunities of States and their property was to unify the applicable
international rules. If different interpretations of what constituted the
relevant general international law were permitted, the applicability of
the draft articles as a whole could be jeopardized.'50
Mr. Mahiou of Algeria expressed the view that:
246. Id.
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Every treaty provision was subject to the test of time, and its inter-
pretation depended on the practice of the international community.
His delegation believed that the interpretation should be neither too
rigid nor too flexible. It hoped that the Commission would delete the
phrase in square brackets.""1
Mr Hayes of Ireland stated that:
The draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States represented a
laudable effort to codify the law in a particularly sensitive and uncer-
tain area. The retention of that phrase would constitute an abandon-
ment of that objective and would cast doubt on the usefulness of
adopting a set of draft articles with such a reduced scope. If the inclu-
sion of the phrase should be necessary to ensure the adoption of the
articles, it would mean that the subject was not yet amenable to
codification.2 "
Mr. Lacleta of Spain stated that:
Once the rules laid down in the draft acquired the status of codified
rules, they would be applicable in their own right and would therefore
not require any supplementary reference to other relevant rules of
general international law, which would of course continue to apply to
issues not covered by the draft articles.
2 5
.
In summarizing the formal written comments on the draft, the Spe-
cial Rapporteur concluded that the states which support retaining this
language seek "to maintain sufficient flexibility and to accommodate any
further developments in State practice and the corresponding adoption of
general international law." 2" States opposing the language adhere to the
absolute principle of state immunity and argue that, "to seek exceptions
from immunity outside the framework of the draft articles is illogical and
.. .would only serve to encourage unilateral restrictions of the immunity
of a State and leave room for different interpretations." '55 The Special
Rapporteur has proposed deleting the language which, in his view, "could
perpetuate controversy, not only on matters in the grey zone but also on
matters that belonged to limitations or exceptions under the future
Conventions.
256
The Special Rapporteur has sidestepped the controversial question of
the relationship between the principle of state immunity and the cases in
which a state is not entitled to claim immunity. This controversy is re-
flected in the title to Part III: "[Limitations on] [Exceptions to] State
Immunity." He recognizes that states are split on this issue according to
251. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (37th mtg.) 1 66, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.37 (1986).
252. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (32nd mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.32 (1986).
253. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (36th mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.36 (1986).
254. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 43 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 259, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988), to be reprinted in [1988] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N (Part 2). (hereinafter 1988 Int'l L. Comm'n)
255. Supra note 24, at 46.
256. 1988 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 254, at 260.
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their support for the absolute or for the restrictive theory of immunity.
The serious nature of this division is apparent in the statements of Mem-
ber States in The General Assembly.
Mr. Badr of Qatar expressed the view that:
The Commission's general approach to the subject of the jurisdic-
tional immunities of States and their property, which assumed the ex-
istence of a rule of public international law requiring all States to
grant immunity from the jurisdiction of their courts to all other States
and which therefore limited the Commission's work to the identifica-
tion of agreed exceptions to that rule, was a source of difficulties be-
cause it tended to reduce to a minimum the number of such excep-
tions. Both the doctrine and the case-law of many States attested to
the fact that the existence of a general rule of immunity was far from
being recognized by the majority. One must not be misled by such
maxims as par in parem non habet imperium, which furthermore
dated only from the fourteenth century. If the myth of a general rule
of immunity were abandoned, it would be easier to reach agreement
on a truly restrictive approach to immunity such as that reflected in
multilateral conventions and in a great deal of recent national
legislation.257
In contrast, Mr. Makarevitch of the USSR stated that:
The draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their
property should be based on the concept of full immunity not limited
or functional immunity. Such an approach was dictated by the princi-
pal of sovereign equality of States, a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law. The consistent use of the concept of full immunity in the
drafting of all the articles on the topic was an important prerequisite
if the future convention was to have meaning and be generally accept-
able to States with different socio-economic systems. His delegation
strongly objected to the tendency to use the concept of "limited"
State immunity in the text of specific draft articles.25 8
The Special Rapporteur has suggested that this question will be more
easily resolved "after all the issues pertaining to the rest of the draft have
been settled, without prejudice to the doctrinal position of each
Government."2 '
The Special Rapporteur has recommended two new provisions con-
cerning state enterprises. The first provision would be added to the defi-
nition of a state for the purpose of jurisdictional immunities contained in
draft article 3. The proposed language would exclude state enterprises
from the definition:
[a] State enterprise which is distinct from the State, has a right of
possessing and disposing of a segregated State property and is capable
of suing or being sued, shall not be included in the agencies or instru-
257. 41 U.N. GAOR IC.6 (27th mtg.) 99, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.27 (1986).
258. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (29th mtg.) 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.29 (1986).
259. Preliminary Report, supra note 24, at 65.
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mentalities of that State, even if the State enterprise has been en-
trusted with public functions. "
The second recommendation for state enterprises relates to draft article
11 concerning commercial contracts. The proposed language would limit
the ability of a state to invoke immunity for claims relating to commercial
contracts entered into by state enterprises.26'
The nature and role of state enterprises is the subject of controversy
reflecting disagreement over the public or private character of the eco-
nomic activities of a state. The recommended provisions would seem to
add more confusion than clarity to this controversial issue. Under draft
article 3, as provisionally adopted, a state entity would be entitled to
claim immunity only to the extent that it is entitled to perform acts in
the exercise of the sovereign authority of the state. The exercise of sover-
eign authority is the essential criterion for the application of state immu-
nity, not the ability to possess or to dispose of segregated State property.
Similarly, the absence of immunity for a claim relating to a commercial
contract is based on the commercial nature of the transaction, as indi-
cated in the existing draft article 11. It is unclear how these proposals will
be received by the Commission.
The Special Rapporteur has also proposed a new approach to the
question of determining the commercial character of a contract. Under
his proposed amendment, the general rule would be an objective criterion
based on the nature of the contract or transaction. However, states would
be free to provide for the consideration of the subjective purpose of a
contract in determining its character either by international agreement or
by the terms of the contract.2 62 This new approach would protect the in-
terest of a private party that enters into a commercial contract with a
state and, at the same time, would accommodate those states which favor
consideration of the purpose of a contract.
The phrase "commercial [non-governmental]" appears in the provi-
sions concerning the commercial shipping activities of a state and the im-
munity of state property contained in articles 18, 21, and 23. This contro-
versial double criterion creates the possibility of "commercial
governmental" activity. The Special Rapporteur has characterized the use
of the term "non-governmental" as ambiguous and an unnecessary source
of controversy. Thus he has proposed deleting the word "non-governmen-
tal" from the relevant provisions.26
The Commission has yet to determine the final form of the draft arti-
cles on jurisdictional immunities. There are fundamental issues which
must be resolved during the Commission's second and final reading of the
260. 1988 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 254, at 262.
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draft, either on the basis of amendments suggested by the new Special
Rapporteur, or proposals which may emerge from the discussion in the
Commission. Once the Commission has completed its work, it will be for
the General Assembly to decide whether to pursue an international con-
vention on the basis of the Commission's draft. While the future of the
draft articles is uncertain, there can be no doubt that the ILC reports and
draft articles on this subject represent a major contribution to achieving a
greater understanding of the law of state immunity.

